I recently reread Quine's "Two Dogmas," and I found myself with a question.
In "Two Dogmas" Quine argues that there is no principled line to be drawn between analytic and synthetic judgments. After dismissing several other versions of the distinction, he caches out synthetic judgments as those that are confirmed or dismissed on the basis of experience, and analytic judgments as those who truth or falsity are determined independently of experience. So "All bachelors are unmarried" would be analytic, since no experience could change disconfirm that sentence. All experience is irrelevant for the truth of the statement.
Anyway: The way I read him, Quine argues that any judgment can be preserved independent of all experience. Take the proposition "My computer is making funny noises right now," which, sadly, I take to be a truth. Reductionism would claim that there is a partition of experiences into those that confirm my proposition, those that disconfirm my proposition, and those that are irrelevant to my proposition. But there's very little forcing me to carve up experiences in this way. Say that I hold the belief that God is a deceiver, and that he is systematically making me hear things that are not actually being sounded. Well, then my experience of hearing funny noises from my computer isn't really relevant any more to the truth of my proposition. How you classify experiences depends on all of one's other judgments, so that carving up experiences in this way is folly.
As a consequence, I can maintain the belief in any proposition in the face of any experiences. I just have to change something else in my corporate body of beliefs.
OK so far. But it seems to me that someone committed to the analytic/synthetic distinction could easily bounce back from this. Conventionally, it would never be appropriate to change one's belief in an analytic proposition because of experience. After all, "All bachelors are unmarried" shouldn't depend on experience in any way. So just stipulate that analytic statements are those that are never confirmed or disconfirmed by experience, and synthetic statements are those that are capable of being challenged by experience. Or something like that.
Now, I do understand that this doesn't touch Quine. Quine believes that logical and "linguistic" truths really could be challenged by experience. It would be appropriate to revise one's logical beliefs, for instance, given a challenge to the theory. Anything is fair game. Quine's argument against the analytic/synthetic distinction is buttressed by his fallibilism.
What I found myself wondering is, could there be any way to continue the challenge to the analytic/synthetic distinction without invoking the fallibility of our logical and linguistic beliefs? What would it look like to reject the fallibility of our logical beliefs as well as the analytic/synthetic distinction?
I need to think about this some more, especially since I think I just am beginning to understand what fallibility entails. This was a messy post. Sorry!
Sunday, October 2, 2011
Monday, December 20, 2010
Saturday, December 4, 2010
A random thought on philosophy
Here's a good way of getting at the difference between bad philosophy and good philosophy. Bad philosophy strips away the insight from fundamental questions and leaves behind a stack of uninteresting details. Good philosophy, on the other hand, is able to take a stack of seemingly uninteresting details and reveal how they determine matters of fundamental interest.
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
Clarification on Correlation
Here's something that I think is true. Hume notes that we can never observe causation in the world, rather we can only observe "constant conjunction." What does this mean? Suppose that your picture of human observation is that we can download an image of the world apart from the concepts that we apply to it.
Let me use an example to illustrate this: I think that apples are tasty. When I see an apple, I think "Damn, that apple is tasty." Does this mean that I'm observing tastiness in the world? Quite plausibly, no, it doesn't. Instead, what I'm doing is observing the apple and once my brain knows that the apple is tasty it applies "tastiness" to it. Contrast this with my actual observation of the apple's presence with my hand. With my hand I sense it's firmness, it's smoothness and this tells me that the apple is extended in space and of a certain texture. Now, does this work like tastiness? That is, do I first observe the apple and then apply to the apple the properties of "extended in space" or "firm"? No, this doesn't seem quite right. Rather, what I'm directly observing is that it fills my hands or pushes back when I squeeze.
(Of course, you might disagree. You might be Kant, for instance, and think that we only observe the world through the a priori categories. Or you might disagree in many other ways.)
The point in the above example is something close to what Hume wants (this is contingent on my memory of Hume from my freshman year course is true). That is, there are some things that we observe directly in the world--primary qualities or something--and there are things that we apply to our observations in the world.
Causation belongs to the second category according to Hume. His argument, if I recall, relies on his specific empiricist theory on the origins of knowledge (that it must have its source through the senses or through something like the analytic manipulation of concepts, and the source of all concepts is from experience, and the way that concepts are gained from experience is that there is a picture of what you experience in your thoughts [I think this is something close to what he says...I need a refresher.]) But we can make the point on our own way too. Take a billiard ball hitting another billiard ball. A very reasonable thing to say is that the first billiard ball caused the second billiard ball to move. Without a doubt, this is very reasonable. But how do we know this? From experience? What experience? The experience that other billiard balls cause other billiard balls to move? That certainly won't do, because it's clearly circular. So instead we want to say something such as, we know that Ball1 caused Ball2 to move because whenever we see Ball1 collide with Ball2, Ball2 moves. This gets more clear on the point--what we really observe is just a collision event; causation is more like tastiness, something that our faculty of reason applies to the observation. Just as my mind applies "tasty" to applies, my mind applies "caused" to a collision event. And even if Ball1 collides in this way with Ball2 many times and each time Ball2 moves, all we have is more of the same collision observation. For Hume, it's unclear where causation gets in.
All of this is to say that I realized that I usually tell this story wrong, both to myself and to others. I usually say that the difference is between causation and correlation, even though I know that Hume talks not about correlation, but rather "constant conjunction." I realized today that there's an important difference here. I think that Hume would probably say that correlation, as we use the term today, is just like causation in being outside of observation.
Correlation refers to a trend, or a tendency for two things to go along together. When I took a statistical inference seminar what the teacher reminded us is that there's alternate explanations for a correlation between two events, other than one causing the other. For instance, one further event might cause both of these events. Or something like that.
Another alternative is that it could be some sort of coincidence that these two events occur with each other all the time. In such an event, the proper thing to say is that there is actually no real correlation between the two events. Rather, there has been some sort of mistake--maybe a sampling error, leading us to think that these two events go together, when in fact they do not. In such a case the proper thing might be to say that there was just a coincidence when we observed these two events occuring together.
My point is that this is what Hume needs. His point is that all we see are coincidences, snapshots of the world as it is at a particular moment, not extended through time and not extended through space. All we have in experience are a series of unrelated flash-frames of the world, and all you get are coincidences, and you can't know causation through experience. But I think that also means that you can't get correlation either.
(Another way of getting to this point much more quickly: Hume also famously argues that we have no empirical grounds for believing in induction. How can you establish a correlation without relying on induction?)
Let me use an example to illustrate this: I think that apples are tasty. When I see an apple, I think "Damn, that apple is tasty." Does this mean that I'm observing tastiness in the world? Quite plausibly, no, it doesn't. Instead, what I'm doing is observing the apple and once my brain knows that the apple is tasty it applies "tastiness" to it. Contrast this with my actual observation of the apple's presence with my hand. With my hand I sense it's firmness, it's smoothness and this tells me that the apple is extended in space and of a certain texture. Now, does this work like tastiness? That is, do I first observe the apple and then apply to the apple the properties of "extended in space" or "firm"? No, this doesn't seem quite right. Rather, what I'm directly observing is that it fills my hands or pushes back when I squeeze.
(Of course, you might disagree. You might be Kant, for instance, and think that we only observe the world through the a priori categories. Or you might disagree in many other ways.)
The point in the above example is something close to what Hume wants (this is contingent on my memory of Hume from my freshman year course is true). That is, there are some things that we observe directly in the world--primary qualities or something--and there are things that we apply to our observations in the world.
Causation belongs to the second category according to Hume. His argument, if I recall, relies on his specific empiricist theory on the origins of knowledge (that it must have its source through the senses or through something like the analytic manipulation of concepts, and the source of all concepts is from experience, and the way that concepts are gained from experience is that there is a picture of what you experience in your thoughts [I think this is something close to what he says...I need a refresher.]) But we can make the point on our own way too. Take a billiard ball hitting another billiard ball. A very reasonable thing to say is that the first billiard ball caused the second billiard ball to move. Without a doubt, this is very reasonable. But how do we know this? From experience? What experience? The experience that other billiard balls cause other billiard balls to move? That certainly won't do, because it's clearly circular. So instead we want to say something such as, we know that Ball1 caused Ball2 to move because whenever we see Ball1 collide with Ball2, Ball2 moves. This gets more clear on the point--what we really observe is just a collision event; causation is more like tastiness, something that our faculty of reason applies to the observation. Just as my mind applies "tasty" to applies, my mind applies "caused" to a collision event. And even if Ball1 collides in this way with Ball2 many times and each time Ball2 moves, all we have is more of the same collision observation. For Hume, it's unclear where causation gets in.
All of this is to say that I realized that I usually tell this story wrong, both to myself and to others. I usually say that the difference is between causation and correlation, even though I know that Hume talks not about correlation, but rather "constant conjunction." I realized today that there's an important difference here. I think that Hume would probably say that correlation, as we use the term today, is just like causation in being outside of observation.
Correlation refers to a trend, or a tendency for two things to go along together. When I took a statistical inference seminar what the teacher reminded us is that there's alternate explanations for a correlation between two events, other than one causing the other. For instance, one further event might cause both of these events. Or something like that.
Another alternative is that it could be some sort of coincidence that these two events occur with each other all the time. In such an event, the proper thing to say is that there is actually no real correlation between the two events. Rather, there has been some sort of mistake--maybe a sampling error, leading us to think that these two events go together, when in fact they do not. In such a case the proper thing might be to say that there was just a coincidence when we observed these two events occuring together.
My point is that this is what Hume needs. His point is that all we see are coincidences, snapshots of the world as it is at a particular moment, not extended through time and not extended through space. All we have in experience are a series of unrelated flash-frames of the world, and all you get are coincidences, and you can't know causation through experience. But I think that also means that you can't get correlation either.
(Another way of getting to this point much more quickly: Hume also famously argues that we have no empirical grounds for believing in induction. How can you establish a correlation without relying on induction?)
Sunday, May 9, 2010
This is silly.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-harris/a-science-of-morality_b_567185.html
Why is this debate happening between a pop intellectual figure and a physicist? Why is Sam Harris attempting to do moral philosophy without any training or background, and why is he engaging with the philosophical thought of a physicist (however cogent) instead of the experts in moral philosophy? Would he consider calling a really-smart philosopher to discuss the implications of physics or neuroscience?
I can think of a couple of explanations for this:
1) Sam Harris thinks that philosophy is easy. So he can do it.
2) Sam Harris thinks that philosophers are stupid.
3) Sam Harris is completely ignorant of philosophy.
I have to admit, I'm a little bit confused by the fact that people take him seriously. Sam Harris seems like a fool, as far as I can tell, and it makes me wonder whether I'm just wrong in my evaluation of him. But if I'm not wrong, then some philosophers should put him in his place. Korsgaard, please?
Why is this debate happening between a pop intellectual figure and a physicist? Why is Sam Harris attempting to do moral philosophy without any training or background, and why is he engaging with the philosophical thought of a physicist (however cogent) instead of the experts in moral philosophy? Would he consider calling a really-smart philosopher to discuss the implications of physics or neuroscience?
I can think of a couple of explanations for this:
1) Sam Harris thinks that philosophy is easy. So he can do it.
2) Sam Harris thinks that philosophers are stupid.
3) Sam Harris is completely ignorant of philosophy.
I have to admit, I'm a little bit confused by the fact that people take him seriously. Sam Harris seems like a fool, as far as I can tell, and it makes me wonder whether I'm just wrong in my evaluation of him. But if I'm not wrong, then some philosophers should put him in his place. Korsgaard, please?
Outlne of the main argument of "Self-Constitution"
As far as I can tell, this is Korsgaard's picture of things
1. "Every object and activity is defined by certain standards that are both constitutive of it and normative for it." (32) For activities, a standard is called a constitutive principle in the case that "if you are not guided by the principle, you are not performing the activity at all." (28)
2. "The function of an action is to constitute an agent." (82)
3. "The function of an action is to render one efficacious and autonomous" (83). This is because being efficacious and autonomous are constitutive standards for being an agent.
4. In addition, "It is essential [/constitutive] to the concept of agency that the agent be unified" (18) This is because "in order to be autonomous, it is essential that your movements be caused by you." (213)
5. In the case of humans, unifying one's agency (through deliberation) is work that needs to be done before any self-conscious action is possible.
6. Justice is how we unify our own agency, and so "Platonic justice is a constitutive principle of action." This is identical to the categorical imperative (213).
7. All of this assures that one will be inwardly just. But one who is inwardly just will be outwardly just as well, since reasons the kind of unity you need is a unity not just of your person, but a kind of unity that counts the reasons of everyone, ala Nagel.
1. "Every object and activity is defined by certain standards that are both constitutive of it and normative for it." (32) For activities, a standard is called a constitutive principle in the case that "if you are not guided by the principle, you are not performing the activity at all." (28)
2. "The function of an action is to constitute an agent." (82)
3. "The function of an action is to render one efficacious and autonomous" (83). This is because being efficacious and autonomous are constitutive standards for being an agent.
4. In addition, "It is essential [/constitutive] to the concept of agency that the agent be unified" (18) This is because "in order to be autonomous, it is essential that your movements be caused by you." (213)
5. In the case of humans, unifying one's agency (through deliberation) is work that needs to be done before any self-conscious action is possible.
6. Justice is how we unify our own agency, and so "Platonic justice is a constitutive principle of action." This is identical to the categorical imperative (213).
7. All of this assures that one will be inwardly just. But one who is inwardly just will be outwardly just as well, since reasons the kind of unity you need is a unity not just of your person, but a kind of unity that counts the reasons of everyone, ala Nagel.
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Is epistemic anti-realism really the same thing as losing the authority of a system of norms? I know that this isn't obvious, and I haven't accepted it naively. The worry is that it isn't. That you can still accept a norm while independently questioning its metaphysical status--that these are just entirely different things.
I don't think that they are, though. As usual, I start with Epistemic Nihilism. If you think that there are no epistemic norms then it's hard to see why you should believe an argument for epistemic nihilism--that's my main argument. I think that nihilism can't help but make practical recommendations--you lose epistemology as a source of authority if there really are no epistemic norms. It's similar to saying that the teacher isn't a fount of reasons. It's the same with epistemic nihilism--epistemology isn't a fount of reasons. You don't actually have reason to believe anything. I take this case to be fairly strong.
And what about other forms of anti-realism? I think that this is a somewhat controversial claim, but that from the realist's perspective this isn't what epistemology means. Hmm...now that I write that I realize that there's something unclear there. Am I resting on the normativity of the meaning of epistemology? Am I saying that for the realist "epistemology" means something different than it does for the expressivist? A little bit. But if so this is kinda weird. The expressivist and the realist aren't even talking about the same domain? That doesn't sound right. Anyway, metaphysical status of norms should be independent of the identification of those norms, in the same way realists about numbers are talking about the same numbers as fictionalists.
So let me try that again. It's not about what epistemology means. It's rather about the reasons that the realist accepts. The realist doesn't accept the expressivist's reasons. Now, this isn't quite right either, because it's the same reasons for both--it's just the metaphysical status of those reasons that is in question.
OK, so let me try this one more time. The issue is whether the expressivist (or any other anti-realist) can give the realist reasons that the realist will respect. On the one hand, yes, they can. They can offer reasons to believe various things, and the realist will interpret them in a certain way, and they will interpret what they are doing in a different way. But all of this is only helpful to the extent that the realist is able to interpret the reason in a realist way. If she can't, then how can we expect her to respect it? It's not the sort of thing she recognizes as having force. Oy, this is problematic too because reasons aren't the sort of thing you choose to respect. I'm not sure. OK.
I don't think that they are, though. As usual, I start with Epistemic Nihilism. If you think that there are no epistemic norms then it's hard to see why you should believe an argument for epistemic nihilism--that's my main argument. I think that nihilism can't help but make practical recommendations--you lose epistemology as a source of authority if there really are no epistemic norms. It's similar to saying that the teacher isn't a fount of reasons. It's the same with epistemic nihilism--epistemology isn't a fount of reasons. You don't actually have reason to believe anything. I take this case to be fairly strong.
And what about other forms of anti-realism? I think that this is a somewhat controversial claim, but that from the realist's perspective this isn't what epistemology means. Hmm...now that I write that I realize that there's something unclear there. Am I resting on the normativity of the meaning of epistemology? Am I saying that for the realist "epistemology" means something different than it does for the expressivist? A little bit. But if so this is kinda weird. The expressivist and the realist aren't even talking about the same domain? That doesn't sound right. Anyway, metaphysical status of norms should be independent of the identification of those norms, in the same way realists about numbers are talking about the same numbers as fictionalists.
So let me try that again. It's not about what epistemology means. It's rather about the reasons that the realist accepts. The realist doesn't accept the expressivist's reasons. Now, this isn't quite right either, because it's the same reasons for both--it's just the metaphysical status of those reasons that is in question.
OK, so let me try this one more time. The issue is whether the expressivist (or any other anti-realist) can give the realist reasons that the realist will respect. On the one hand, yes, they can. They can offer reasons to believe various things, and the realist will interpret them in a certain way, and they will interpret what they are doing in a different way. But all of this is only helpful to the extent that the realist is able to interpret the reason in a realist way. If she can't, then how can we expect her to respect it? It's not the sort of thing she recognizes as having force. Oy, this is problematic too because reasons aren't the sort of thing you choose to respect. I'm not sure. OK.
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