Reply to critics, II

Still focusing on Chapter 1, here's another objection, that I think lands a little bit harder on my argument than the previous objection I considered.

OBJECTION: "You argue, perhaps correctly, that any reason for epistemic anti-realism would either be a reason external to epistemology, or internal to epistemology. You then argue that an external epistemic reasons makes no sense, and that an internal epistemic reason doesn't make any sense either. External epistemic reasons would have to be epistemic reasons that don't draw on epistemology, so I'll give you that one. But internal reasons seem OK to me. You say that such reasons would be paradoxical or self-defeating in nature, since they would be reasons that say "Don't listen to me!" or "What I say doesn't really matter."

But let's give this a closer look. It seems as if you're assuming that a thinker must be able to retain the reasons for her belief even after a change in view prompted by accepting that belief. And that doesn't seem to be generally true.

Consider the case of skepticism about the external world. Suppose you think that you have a theory about how perception works--light bounces off stuff, hits eyes, gets processed--and suppose that same theory tells you that you could be dreaming. You also think that this fact undermines your claims to knowledge of the external world. Now, once you no longer believe that you know what the external world is like, you've also lost your grounds for accepting the particular theory of perception. But that doesn't undermine the skeptical position. So: it looks as if it's not generally required for you to retain your reasons for belief even after the change accepting that belief prompts."

REPLY: This is a complicated case that the objector raises, and we owe it to him to go through it carefully and slowly. I think that doing so reveals that the objection fails to hit the mark.

Let's start by saying what it would take to ruin my argument. In order to ruin my argument, you would have to show that internal epistemic reasons can give us reason to reject epistemic norms. I've claimed that they can't, because self-defeating norms fail to give one a reason to believe something. But this objection alleges that this is not true, and that such a reason, though "self-defeating" in some uninteresting sense, are capable of telling you "reject epistemology!" or "don't believe epistemic realism!" So this is what we need to consider.

The objection alleges that my argument goes like this...

(1) A thinker must be able to retain the reasons for her belief even after a change in view prompted by accepting that belief
(2) Therefore, if a person has a reason to reject epistemic realism, then they must still have such a reason even AFTER rejecting epistemic realism
(3) This, however, is impossible.
(4) So we can project back and say that a person never had an epistemic reason after all.

...and that (1) is false. So let's first consider whether (1) is really false, and then we'll consider whether the objector has got my argument right.

Is (1) false? Well, we would have to show that a person need not retain a belief after a change prompted by accepting that belief. The example brought is from perception, so let's deal with that case. Suppose you have a theory of perception that tells you how you gain perceptual knowledge, and something in your theory of perception tells you that you have reason to doubt perception--your understanding of perception entails that everything could seem the same to you if you were dreaming--and so you reject...well, now let's be careful. What are you rejecting? Are you rejecting your theory of perception, or are you rejecting the belief that your observations are trustworthy? The objector needs the former, but the skeptical argument needs the latter.

I think, personally, that the perceptual case is awfully confused as raised by the objector. Why not focus on an easier case? You have a book that urges you to believe many things. One of the things that the book urges your to believe is the following sentence: "Do not believe anything written in this book." The objector wants to say that we have no problem understanding what this means. After all, the book tells us to reject everything written in it, so if we trust the book then we should reject everything written in it. Only after do we realize that--Surprise!--our reason was undermined. This seems strange. Imagine if you were told, "Believe that p, though you won't have any reason to believe that p five minutes from now." This seems odd.

This reminds me of the discussion in "Possibility of Altruism" of a person plotting against oneself. There are a lot of examples that go against what the objector alleges. Here.

In short, I think it's far from clear that (1) is false, and the example marshaled by the objector certainly doesn't prove that.

But let's say that the objector is correct, and that (1) ought to be rejected. Is it true that my argument relies on this premise? I'm going to think about this a little bit more. I'll continue this train of thought tomorrow. But I think that this is enough to remove the objection from my argument.

ON SECOND THOUGHT: The above response was confused. I think that a proper reply will show that there's a difference here between beliefs and reasons, and I'll argue for that tomorrow.

Reply to critics, I

Maybe someday I'll be a world-famous philosopher and have an opportunity to reply to critics who find my work deeply engaging and paradigm-shifting. For now, my critic is my advisor who is pretty skeptical of my arguments. So here's my attempt to respond to the concerns that he raises. He attacks my central line of argument in the first chapter, which is really pretty crucial to my argument.

OBJECTION: "You say that there can be no internal epistemic reasons to reject epistemology, because any reasons would be self-defeating or paradoxical. Any such reasons, you claim, would be akin to a person who says 'Don't believe what I am saying!'

But here's one way someone might resist this argument, and I don't think that it appeals to any particularly epistemic norms. A system of norms must provide some guidance; if it doesn't, accepting that system does not allow one to guide one's behavior or belief-formation. Hence, incoherent systems are thereby shown to be such that one can't adopt them."

REPLY: This certainly seems to make sense--what good to us is some incoherent system?--but I want to move carefully through this point. Let's first consider if the objector is alleging that some norm requires us to reject epistemic realism, or if the believer is under some sort of obligation to reject epistemic realism.

Here's one thing that this objection could be saying: we have epistemic reason to reject any system of norms that is incoherent. The fact that a system of norms is incoherent gives us an epistemic reason to believe that it is false. This, I think, is a fairly weak objection. I think that there is something very confusing about obeying a norm that loses its force as soon as you believe it. (The reader does object to my contention that we can't follow paradoxical norms, but I'll take that up later). Anyway, that's not what this objection was claiming to do--it was suggesting that we don't have to rely on epistemic norms in order to reject epistemic realism, since it's incoherent.

I'll attack another straw man, as long as I'm at it: one might say that there's a requirement that goes above and beyond epistemology such that it can pass judgement on epistemology from outside it. That is, perhaps the norm(s) of coherence, that state that we have reason to reject any system of norms that is incoherent, stands outside epistemology and is prior to it. This, however, would merely place some other set of norms above epistemology. Of course, this is possible, but two things should be noted. First, the objector is usually motivated by a kind of queasiness about norms-realism in general, and it's unclear why he would feel more comfortable with accepting one system of norms governing belief rather than some other. Further, by assumption I am considered "epistemology" to cover all norms governing belief that are truth-related. (There's a debate in epistemology about the value or aim of epistemology, but we all know that epistemic reasons are more truth-related in some regard than any other system of norms governing belief, and it's that sense that I want to invoke here). So, according to my defintions and usage of epistemology, such an objection would actually concede epistemic realism to me.

Perhaps the objector might mean that there are non-epistemic (even for my usage) norms that give us reason not to accept epistemology as real. And I concede this in the thesis. Incoherence gives us a strong, non-epistemic reason to reject a system of norms, for they are of no practical use to us whatsoever. How are we supposed to be guided by norms if they're incoherent?

The objector, however, does not rest. He still claims that he has an objection. But I've exhausted the possibilities while considering that there is some sort of norm that the objector wishes the believer to respond to. Such a norm would either have to be epistemic or non-epistemic; if epistemic, I object on the grounds that such a norm would be paradoxical and self-defeating; if non-epistemic, I concede the point. What else could the objector mean?

Allow me to put some words in the objector's mouth. He writes, "A system of norms must provide some guidance; if it doesn't, accepting that system does not allow one to guide one's behavior or belief-formation. Hence, incoherent systems are thereby shown to be such that one can't adopt them."

Perhaps, then, what he means is that it is constitutive of a system of norms that they be able to guide belief or action. Anything system that is incoherent fails to be a system of norms. And so epistemology, if it is incoherent, fails to be a system of norms.

This is an interesting objection, but I don't think it's a very good one. Here's why I'm not swayed by this objection. Somebody smart once said that in philosophy there are only two kinds of replies to objections: "Who says?!" and "So what?!" First, I'll concede that part of what it means to be a system of norms is that it is able to guide belief or action. The question is, what's the cut-off between saying that a system of norms fails to guide belief-formation WELL, and that a system of norms fails to guide belief-formation AT ALL? If the idea of a system of norms that tells you to both do something and not to do it seems like a problem for you, then why is it only that MASSIVE tensions do the trick. After all, it's a fairly common occurrence where one norm of etiquette tell you not to do something, and another tells you to do that very thing. That doesn't mean that we can't accept that system of norms anymore. But if the idea was that an inconsistent system can't count as a normative system, then why don't we reject etiquette at the first sign of trouble? The reason, I think, is because inner tensions and conflicts are the signs of a bad system, one that doesn't help us very much. But this just means that we're offering a non-epistemic reason to reject a system of norms.

Let me put the point again: The question is whether coherence is definitional of something counting as a system of norms. I'd concede that guiding behavior is definitional of something counting as a system of norms, but I don't think that coherence is. That is because coherence, I think, has to do with how well a system guides behavior. But how do you tell the difference between whether a system is just failing to guide belief well, or whether it's failing to guide anything at all? This is a really tough question. (Part of the problem is that meaning is normative in some sense as well, which is an interesting twist, I think...)

I don't think it matters much. There's a good way to reply to claims that something is constitutive of something else, and that's because such an argument usually only succeeds in hiding normativity, not eliminating it. Here's how it works in this case: suppose that it's constitutive of a system of norms that it be coherent. So epistemology fails as a system of norms, and so I reject it. Fine. Call a system of norms that fails to be coherent a nystum of sorms (or whatever). It turns out epistemology is a nystem of sorms, not a system of norms. I claim that this is fine for epistemology, though, and I continue to appeal to these things as reasons for my beliefs. Then you say "Why, that's stupid, those don't count as anything that could guide your belief" and I say, "Why not?" And it's precisely at this point that you have to give me a reason of some sort or another.

In short: I chased down the objection so that it can't be giving me any normative reason to reject epistemic realism. Then, I considered the idea that it fails to count as a system of norms as a matter of meaning, but then I showed how this is just hiding a norm of belief at some other level, and I decided that this line of objection doesn't sway me. You need objective normativity guiding belief somewhere in the equation.

But there's a more challenging objection that the objector raises against me. This one alleges that there's nothing wrong with a reason being "paradoxical" or "self-defeating" in the sense in which I use it. Such a norm is only self-defeating in the sense that it defeats its own system, but that this is a perfectly understandable thing to say. I will consider that in my next post, coming in 25 hours (religious norms are guiding my action in this case).

Draft finished

Anyone who's interested in reading a draft, I've got one.

Taking Great Philosophers Out of Context: Wittgenstein Edition

"Doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt."

-Wittgenstein, "On Certainty"

That, together with Putnam's quote, could be taken to stand for most of what I argue, I think.

Chapter Three

I'm actually just starting this one. Here's the introduction, anyway:

In the first chapter I argued that there are no possible epistemic reasons to doubt epistemic realism. The second chapter argued that being an epistemic realist involves a degree of arbitrariness. Despite this potential arbitrariness, the vast majority of people are committed to pretty much the same epistemology. The moral realist, however, can take advantage of this potential for unobjectionable arbitrariness by choosing an epistemology that is sympathetic towards his realism. This only allows the realist to get his foot in the door, however, since the anti-realist objects that there are tensions internal to the realist’s epistemology. Presumably, the moral realist is not willing to dissociate himself from most of the world by radically revising his epistemic principles to line up with his realism. This means that his only available option is to disarm the anti-realist objections so that the tension internal to his epistemology is eliminated.

In this thesis I am not up to the task of defending moral realism against all the anti-realist objections. Instead, I will focus on one powerful anti-realist objection, the reliability challenge. This objection alleges that the moral realist is unable to explain how it is that so many of his moral beliefs turn out to be true. I focus on this objection for two reasons. First, it is considered by many to be the most disturbing objection to moral realism. Second, because I believe that reflecting on how the objection might apply to epistemology can help us gain perspective on the problem.

I will conclude this chapter, and the thesis, hoping to have convinced the reader of two things. First, that my approach towards a defense of moral realism is a promising one for the realist. Second, that continued reflection on epistemology is capable of yielding considerable insight on ethics.

Also, I changed my layout

About a week ago I spent a half hour changing my layout. Aint it pretty?

Hashing out the third chapter

Now we're two down, one to go. This one is going to be particularly difficult, since I basically need to write it on the fly. In other words, the first two chapters are ideas that I've had for a while, written down in various versions and refined over the course of weeks and months. The content of this third chapter...not so much. Tomorrow's the day, though, and before I call it a night I want to think a bit about where this chapter's going.

I concluded the previous chapter by stating that what remains for the moral realist is to show that his view doesn't conflict with the rest of our/his epistemology. One of the anti-realist argumens that he faces is the reliability challenge. Properly adjusted, however, and a similar argument applies to epistemology.

So, here's the plan of the final chapter: Start by discussing what remains for the moral realist to do. Establish a properly adjusted parity argument for epistemology and ethics. Outline different responses from realists that have come so far, showing that they weren't always answering the right question (ala Enoch), and then offer my own perspective. I'm a bit nervous about offering my own perspective, since my own perspective hasnt been written down clearly ever, but my idea is that we can swallow our pride and just admit that there is a sort of miracle going on here. But the sort of crazy coincidence that we have to assume is fairly limited--it's that our intuitions aren't that far off. You have to do that if you're going to have any knowledge anyway, since a certain kind of skeptical concern is always possible. In a way, my argument is that this is that this is the input that produces the realist output; the input is the faith that our intuitions aren't wildly divergent with the way that the world actually is.

Chapter Two...

...is almost done. Here's the introduction:

In the previous chapter I argued that belief in epistemic realism is epistemically optional. From this point on, I will assume that there are objective facts corresponding to what epistemic reasons we have. In this chapter I will discuss the search for these facts. My focus will be on the question, how do we know which epistemic facts to accept? How do we know that Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a good principle of belief-formation, and that Inference to the Worst Explanation (IWE) is not? Presumably, we need some further epistemic principle to guide us. What, then, guides us towards that further principle?

I will argue that there is an ineliminable arbitrariness in our epistemic theories. The point can be put in the following way: it might be that—given a fixed set of epistemic principles and norms—all of one’s beliefs will turn out to be justified. Nevertheless, there is no way to provide a reason to accept any particular one of these fixed sets of principles and norms. There are always some elements of a theory that are the result of arbitrary choice, and I will call these aspects the “elemental aspects” of an epistemic theory. I call them “elemental” because commitment to them determines the composition of one’s epistemic theory by way of eliminating degrees of freedom. Choice of elemental aspects of one’s epistemology, however, is ungoverned by epistemology.

If epistemology is somewhat arbitrary, what constraints are there on any given set of principles? Is there nothing wrong with believing IWE? The answer is that there is something wrong with believing IWE, but only within some fixed epistemology. Given a certain epistemology, one’s epistemic principles need to obey one’s own internal standards and norms. What explains what is problematic about IWE is that it conflicts with the internal standards that most of us share.

The upshot of this discussion for moral realism is that since there is a degree of arbitrariness in choice of epistemology, there is nothing objectionable with taking on an epistemology that is sympathetic to moral beliefs, as long as it does not conflict with the rest of one’s epistemic principles and beliefs. Of course, this doesn’t remove the responsibility from the moral realist of disarming the anti-realist objections to his view. But the moral realist needs to do that anyway. Once one looks at things in this way, one recognizes that this is all that the moral realist needs to do. The burden of proof, I will argue, is decisively shifted away from the realist.

One more restatement

I'm trying to get this as crisp as possible in my mind:

Chapter 1: You can't eliminate epistemic normativity through reason.
Chapter 2: There are unjustified epistemic beliefs, so why not build moral realism into them.
Chapter 3: The reliability challenge against moral realism is just the reliability challenge against epistemology, and answering both involves nothing but the faith that we're not massively deceived.

Putnam says...

"The elimination of the normative is attempted mental suicide." (1982)

Chapter One

I just finished a full draft of my first chapter. Here's the introduction:

I believe that there can be no epistemic reason for believing or rejecting epistemic realism. As a consequence, belief in realism is epistemically optional and it is impossible to criticize someone on epistemic grounds for being an realist. My primary goal in this chapter is to defend this claim. Here’s my plan of attack: I begin by presenting epistemic realism and anti-realism. Anti-realists typically believe that they have objections to epistemic realism; indeed, this is what motivates their views. I will argue that the anti-realists are wrong to believe that there are reasons to reject epistemic realism, because it is impossible to have such a reason.
I then discuss an argument offered by Terence Cuneo in his book, “The Normative Web.” He argues for moral realism, on the grounds that any objection against moral realism applies with equal strength to epistemic realism. Drawing on the conclusions I reach in the earlier parts of the chapter, I will argue that since there are no reasons for or against epistemic realism, Cuneo’s argument is flawed.
Epistemic realists shouldn’t get too excited, though, since I will also argue there aren’t any good epistemic reasons for the realist view. What this means is that belief in epistemic realism is epistemically optional. Most beliefs are governed by epistemic norms; epistemic realism isn’t. It is above the epistemic fray, so to speak.