Handed into Nickel about a week ago

I'll begin with a quick summary of Enoch's argument. Enoch is sympathetic to Harman's challenge to the normative realist. Harman argues that one only needs physical and psychological facts in order to explain normative observations. Normative facts play no (indispensable) role in explaining these observations. So normative facts are irrelevant for explanations of non-normative facts. Harman considers this a strong argument against the view that there are objective normative facts.

Although Enoch agrees with Harman that normative facts play no indispensable role in explanations, he argues that there are other ways to justify belief in facts besides indispensability to explanation. After all, what justifies inference to the best explanation (IBE) in the first place? According to Enoch's analysis, IBE is justified because of the "intrinsic indispensability" of the explanatory project. For a project to be intrinsically indispensable to me means that "I have no option of stopping (or not starting) to engage in it" (Enoch 34).

If this analysis is correct, however, deliberation seems to be just as intrinsically indispensable as explanation. Just as we have no option of generally stopping to explain what we observe, we have no option of generally stopping to deliberate when faced with decisions. Finally, Enoch argues that normative truths are indispensable for this deliberative project. Hence, we are as justified in believing in normative truths as we believe in protons, numbers, or anything else that whose existence we inferred from our best explanations. So, Enoch concludes that if IBE is a valid principle, then we are likewise justified in believing in normative truths.

Actually, Enoch believes something stronger than this conditional claim--he believes that we are unconditionally justified in believing in normative truths. But this claim depends on his thesis that he can ground "epistemic justification in pragmatic utility" (42), and he defends that claim in an unpublished manuscript. So I'll limit myself to the conditional conclusion (presented on p.43) that "the price one has to pay in order to reject normative facts is a denial...of the validity of IBE."

In the following analysis I'll raise and begin to develop two challenges to Enoch's argument.

II. Is the deliberative project in tension with the explanatory project?

According to Harman, normative facts neither harm nor help us in our explanatory project--normative facts are irrelevant to explanation. Enoch largely accepts Harman's analysis, but he counters that even if normative facts are irrelevant to explanation, their indispensability to deliberation justifies our belief in them. These normative facts are still irrelevant to explanation, but we have some other justification for introducing them into our ontology.

I am concerned that once these normative facts are introduced into our ontology for the sake of our deliberative project, they cause problems for our explanatory project. In other words, once we accept Enoch's argument we end up with a less-than-best explanation of the world. Our explanation of the world was better before we accepted the existence of normative facts.

If this concern is justified, then there would be a conflict between our deliberative and our explanatory projects. On the one hand, deliberation would be urging us to accept the existence of normative facts, and on the other hand explanation would urge us not accept their existence. We would then need to find a way to reconcile these claims on our ontology, and we might decide that the explanatory concerns override the deliberative ones, in which case we would no longer be justified in believing in normative facts.

Why am I concerned that these normative facts cause explanatory problems? After all, didn't Harman show that normative facts are irrelevant to explanations? This would mean that normative facts do not (help or) harm our explanations. So how can normative facts cause problems for our explanatory project? Harman's claim was actually more limited. He argued that normative facts do not help or harm our explanations of non-normative facts. But once we introduce normative facts into our ontology, they are part of the universe and might have features that need to be explained, just like any other fact might.

Once normative facts are introduced into our ontology, our explanatory project has expanded. We now will seek explanations of any peculiar features of these normative facts. Some of these explanations are easy to supply. For example, "How do we explain our knowledge that these normative facts exist?" has a known explanation; the explanation is that the argument that led us to believe in these facts is valid. But there are other features of these normative facts that will require difficult, hard-to-come-by explanations. For example, it's often observed that normative facts are queer, in the sense that they have motivation built into them, such that if they are true they are sufficient to motivate an agent to act. This makes normative facts quite different from non-normative facts. What explains the queerness of normative facts?

Note that I'm not claiming that entities with these strange features can not exist. That would be rehearsing Mackie's argument from queerness. Rather, I'm making a more modest claim, that these strange features require some sort of explanation. What's the difference between the arguments? An acceptable response to Mackie's argument would be that many of the objects that we normally believe to exist are metaphysically queer, and so queerness is not an obstacle to existence. But that response would be insufficient for my objection. My argument still requires an explanation of this queerness. If there is no explanation for this queerness, then there is something additional in the world that I am unable to explain, and so my explanatory project is worse off than it was before I believed in normative facts.

But isn't my objection based on a confusion? The discovery of the existence of any new object inevitably leads to more questions. This doesn't mean that, somehow, our explanation of the world is worse. Rather, we judge how strong or poor our explanations of the world are given the objects that we believe to exist. For example, suppose that we directly observed a new planet in between Jupiter and Saturn. This would mean that we would have to throw out a lot of our astronomy--all of our laws of gravitation would be wrong. So, in a sense, our explanation of the world is worse off once we know that there is this tenth planet. But this is clearly no reason to reject a planet that we've directly observed. So why isn't it the same when it comes to normative facts? We've recently discovered, thanks to Enoch, that normative facts exist. Once they exist, there are features of these facts that need to be explained.

The difference is that this tenth planet, if it were to exist, pulls its explanatory weight. An explanation of the world that didn't suppose that this tenth planet existed would be a worse explanation than one that did assert its existence, because the former fails to explain our direct observation of the planet. But in the case of normative facts, the facts do not pull any explanatory weight. And so explanation only suffers from their presence.

(There are other ways to respond. Is explanation really needed? What sorts of things need to be explained?)

If my argument works, then Enoch's argument becomes more complicated. In order to reach his conclusion he has to show that the deliberative benefits somehow outweigh the explanatory costs.

III. Does IBE need a justification?

According to Enoch, the proponent of IBE needs to provide "a reason for taking explanatory indispensability to justify ontological commitment" (29). Further, he suggests that any such reason will be unable to justify explanatory indispensability without also justifying deliberative indispensability.

But one may reasonably wonder whether justification might run out at IBE itself. Enoch recognizes that "justifications come to an end somewhere" (42). There are some things that we must accept without justification (unless we’re conformational holists, I suppose, in which case every belief gains has some justification in merit of being part of the overall theory). These primitive beliefs we will hold as true, yet we will be unable to justify them. Supposing we take IBE as such a primitive belief, one that we hold as true but have no justification for. This would seem to undermine Enoch’s argument. He argued that the justification for IBE is the same as the justification for inference to deliberative indispensability—IBE is justified if and only if inference to deliberative indispensability is justified. But if IBE is not justified, then deliberative indispensability is also unjustified.

The question then becomes, is there any reason to take IBE as a primitive belief that is not a reason to take inference to deliberative indispensability as a primitive belief? Now, since we’re refusing to justify IBE, reasons for taking IBE as a primitive are not reasons for thinking IBE is true. We will not be justified, in any sense of the word, when we believe IBE (but since we take IBE to be true, we will be justified when we employ IBE). Rather, we’re looking for a principle that guides our choice of where to stop seeking justification. I will not pretend to have such a principle. However, I can think of plausible candidates that would include IBE but exclude inference to deliberative indispensability in the set of primitive beliefs. For example, perhaps our principle will advise us to take as primitive only those beliefs that have some broad agreement already. We wouldn’t want our most basic beliefs to be too controversial. This is a bit dangerous as a principle, since IBE is itself somewhat controversial. But Enoch’s inference to deliberative indispensability is far more controversial than IBE. It wouldn’t seem prudent to take it as a primitive belief.

Enoch might respond that we are acting arbitrarily here, and that we are simply stacking the deck against his robust meta-normative realism, and that we are unjustified in distinguishing between IBE and Enoch’s own principle. And that is exactly right. The reason why this is a response to Enoch is because he claimed that he could force the proponent of IBE to accept a further principle of belief-formation, inference to those things that are indispensable to deliberation. But the proponent of IBE only needs to do that if he has a justification of IBE; if he has no such justification, because he’s taken IBE as a primitive belief, then there is nothing to justify Enoch’s principle. Then the question is whether Enoch’s principle is attractive as a primitive belief. Plausibly, it is not.

Explaining why Enoch’s principle shouldn’t be taken as a primitive belief is difficult; any principle for choosing primitive beliefs must either be justified or itself taken as a primitive. Eventually justification for these principles guiding the choice of beliefs to be primitive will run out as well, and we’ll be forced to take something as primitive again. At some point we will need to make some arbitrary choices. If Enoch’s argument is “Since we have to make some arbitrary choices eventually, why not arbitrarily choose to include inference to deliberative indispensability?” then I don’t think the argument is very convincing. Of course, since I’ve run out of justification, what I mean is that I don’t like such an argument, though I can’t justify my dislike of the argument. Perhaps I prefer to play things safe and not make arbitrary choices that will expand my ontology. Perhaps I am biased against arguments that would easily allow for principles that would force me to include sorcery into my ontology. One way or another, though, I don’t like this argument, though I can’t justify it.

The point of this line of argument, though, is that the anti-realist can avoid Enoch’s conditional conclusion by moving the discussion into the realm of the arbitrary, as opposed to the realm of the justified. By refusing to justify IBE, the anti-realist forces the burden of proof back on Enoch. Enoch must provide a way to add inference to deliberative indispensability to our set of primitive beliefs without opening the door to any old belief—even one that could justify sorcery—being included in the set of primitive beliefs.

Inference to the best explanation and skepticism

Inference to the best explanation is a really interesting philosophical topic.

Let's start the story with Descartes. Skepticism becomes an option--what if we're all being deceived? What if our eyes and ears are lying to us? Descartes tried to answer this question by starting with some firm knowledge and slowly justifying almost all of our knowledge from a few secure facts. In this way all our purported knowledge would be justified, and we would be allowed our confidence again.

As the story goes, not everyone agreed with Descartes secure truths. So other attempts at justifying our knowledge, at securing epistemology, began. Locke and Hume tried to justify human knowledge by matching all knowledge with observation. But, famously, this only gets you so far. So empiricism doesn't work to give us complete, skeptic-free confidence in our beliefs.

(Here I fudge the story a bit.) So what do you do now? Is it a free for all just because we don't have an answer to the skeptic? No, it's not. What we do is acknowledge that justification needs to end somewhere, and as it turns out justification for our beliefs ends before the point where we would feel totally secure in our beliefs. So there isn't any answer to the absolute skeptic. But that means we need to figure out where to stop.

So the game becomes trying to build your house as close to the cliff as possible. You lose if your house falls off the cliff, and you also lose if your house ends up looking like a mess. That is, the game is to find a starting point with as few assumptions as possible (satisfying a general desire for parsimony in the absence of justification) and building and justifying as much of our common-sense and scientific beliefs as possible. You lose if you end up with skepticism, and you also lose if you end up justifying silly beliefs, like beliefs in fairies or witches.

Right now I'm reading a paper where someone tries to say "We don't have to stop the trail of justification at inference to the best explanation. We have a way to justify inference to the best explanation that makes sense." As it turns out, that way of justifying inference to the best explanation is designed to allow for other kind of "inferences" besides inference to the best explanation. Specifically, it wants to allow for inference to the only things that make deliberation possible, which would include normative facts.

As far as I can tell, the debate about this paper has to be (obviously about the details of his argument, he needs to show lots of little points in order to get his big points into play) about whether he tried to go too far back. If his stopping point is no better than Inference to the Best Explanation, I think he'll find many people saying "Hmm, yeah that's interesting. I'm going to build my house right over here on ground that's a bit more secure, right here with Inference to the Best Explanation."

[His response will be, but building your house over there you still haven't made deliberation possible, but that's the second half of his debate. If the first point is dependent on the second, then he's got a very different argument on his hands.]

There's also a debate (that I know nothing about) where people wonder if inference to the best explanation is the right place to stop for reasons that have nothing to do with ethics.

Also, an observation: there are no arguments for mathematical or ethical realism that are particular to math or ethics. That's because realism itself isn't restricted to math or ethics. You win the realist game if you define plausible methods for coming to physical truths, and then use those same methods for reaching mathematical or ethical truths. This is exactly what inference to the best explanation/indispensability arguments do.

A weird idea about reductionism

What is reductionism? Here's an example of a reductionist approach--a reductionist approach to metaphor. You start with a sentence that seems kinda weird: "The city is a jungle; you've got to take care of yourself." So, on the surface this sentence seems to be quite similar to sentences where you identify two things, or at least apply some property to some subject, EX: "Michael is that guy" or "The eagle is a giant bird." If you classify "The city is a jungle" with those sorts of sentences you get really screwed up results. What I mean is, if you take "The city is a jungle" literally you'll either think that I'm classifying the city in the category of jungles--cities are jungles--which is just stupid. Obviously, that's not how you're supposed to read "The city is a jungle."

Quite clearly, what we need is to analyze what "The city is a jungle" means. What it really means is "The city is similar to the jungle in certain ways [e.g. it's dangerous and complex]." The point is that you start with some weird way of speaking that we don't think that we should take literally, and we reduce it to a level of discourse that we're more comfortable taking literally. This is what I just did with metaphor.

A more philosophical example: We start with the notion of causation, and we think that it's mysterious and confusing (Hume thought this). He doesn't think that a literal understanding of causation makes much sense, so he reduces it to a more down-to-Earth notion. So he takes a sentence "A causes B" and translates it as "Whenever B happens, A happens too." He's reduced discussion of causation to a discussion of correlation, the occurrence of two events at the same moment.

People do this to ethics too (Harman recommends that one has to do this in order to maintain ethical realism). "Saving lives is good" sounds a bit spooky, and it's not clear what things in the universe ethics is talking about, and if it's anything it would seem that it would have to be abstract objects or properties that you can't see, smell, touch, etc.... There's a bunch of problems. So people say, "Well, let's take a reductionist approach to ethics; we'll translate ethical statements into normal ones that we feel more comfortable with." So this, for example, can mean that ethics gets translated into the language of emotions--after all, we all agree that people's emotional reactions exist, and so everyone should feel comfortable talking about that. For example, you might reduce/translate "X is good" or "Y is bad" into "I like X" or "I don't approve of Y." (That would be called "emotivism", and it's a reductionist approach to ethics). If you're willing to translate everything into the language of emotional responses, then you no longer have to say that there's anything special about the language of ethics; truth in ethics is just truth about evaluating the way you feel. There are no ethical facts, only physical facts, and in particular, physical facts about emotional responses to situations and actions.

I wonder, though, what if we were to try to reduce physical facts into ethical ones? That's a bit of a loony idea. But suppose that we felt comfortable with ethical facts and uncomfortable with physical ones. What's stopping us from trying to reduce physical facts to ethical ones? If it works in one direction, it should be possible to do it in the other.

How would that project go, though? We would need to find an ethical translation of all statements that refer to physical objects of properties! Let's take an example, "There is a zebra eating grass behind the barn." Now, could we simply translate this as "It's good that zebras eat grass behind barns"? Of course not, for a bunch of reasons. First, because it's not really a translation--we're still referring to zebras, grass, and barns, and this means that I'm still committed to the truth of some physical facts. Second, because a reductionist approach works when you can capture what is meant by the original sentence (for the most part) in the translation. There will be lots of situations when we would want to say, intuitively, that there is a zebra is eating grass, but we wouldn't always want to say that that's a good thing. Come to think of it, while the second is true, the first problem I mentioned is the real problem.

So, what's the reason behind this failure? Part of the problem is that there aren't any particular ethical objects that we can employ. The language of physical objects is very rich, and the language of ethical objects is quite poor. So what could we do to correct this? Maybe expand our circle out from ethics, and let's employ all talk of values (this will include discussions of beauty, simplicity, etc.). It's still no good, I think, and I'm willing to diagnose the problem in the following way: value language has a lot of predicates, concepts, properties, but very few objects.

(So there's a few complications to what I wrote. First, for naturalists there are only scientific facts, so to ask whether I can translate physical facts into ethical ones is a question that wouldn't make sufficient sense. Also, I'd have to show how this argument works in math. Could we begin to talk about reducing physical concepts to mathematical ones? Probably not, but why? Is it because the language is so sparse. So then what's my point here?)

The absence of ethical objects in our everday ethical manner of speaking is a complication that I run into in my research. The indispensability argument in math concludes that mathematical entities exist; it's not clear that anybody really wants such an argument to work in ethics. We want the objectivity of ethics, but ethics-talk usually involves applying predicates/concepts/properties to physical things--acts, deeds, states of the world, rules, whatever.

I think that this is a more precise way of saying Harman's argument. The reason why ethics seems to be dispensable, the reason why our best explanation of the world doesn't need it, is because it doesn't make reference to any ethical objects, just ethical concepts/predicates. And part of the reason why math seems indispensable is because we're making reference to mathematical entities.

Earlier I posted about why existence--ontology--should matter to us. After all, even if we have an argument that concludes that numbers exist we won't start suddenly bumping into numbers on our way to the library, work or school. Our lives will be the same; it's our perspective on the world that is liable to change. And I put out the following idea: the reason why existence is interesting is because ontology seems to secure semantics. We know that some sentence can be true or false if it refers to objects that actually exist--if it's actually talking ABOUT something in the world. So ontology becomes a handmaiden of semantics. Some philosophers disagree with this; they think that it's interesting to investigate the world to settle the question of what exists and what doesn't. I'm not sympathetic to that view. We know what it's like to live in the world, and if we're positing the existence of acausal, abstract objects that shouldn't really change my life. But it still seems to matter whether stuff exists or not, and I argued that the only reason that I knew of was because if X exists it seems that it could be true or false to say stuff about X.

If what I've posted is right, then there might be very different problems facing philosophers of math and metaethicists. Philosophers of math need to secure the objectivity of math by saying that mathematical objects exist. But ethics doesn't really make reference, in general, to ethical objects. They just apply ethical predicates to regular, normal physical objects. So the question of objectivity in ethics might be the kind that our form of the indispensability argument can't really touch.

Summing up the way I've been thinking so far

I'm about to dig into a more substantial phase of research now. Over the next few weeks I'm going to be trying to understand what an explanation of the world is, and what the differences are between science, math, and ethics in this regard. So before I do, I want to clarify what I'm going into this research with, what my hypothesis (of sorts) is. I can't really defend this view; it's just a starting point, a bunch of suspicions that I have.

Without a doubt there is something that is quite different about ethics, science and math. Pinning down exactly what is really the challenge, and the next challenge is trying to figure out what those differences should mean--why the differences matter.

My general hypothesis is that hard, strong, epistemological lines tend to break down under stress. For example, Quine convinced most of the philosophical world that there is no strong, philosophically useful distinction between the meaning of words in a sentence and the substance of those sentences; there's no strong dichotomy between analytic sentences and synthetic ones. The argument comes down to just applying a great deal of stress to the dichotomy, and watching it collapse under investigation. I expect, coming into a philosophical investigation, a similar thing to happen when we've set up boundaries between realms of knowledge. Facts/values, empirical/non-empirical, a priori/a posteriori, history/science, objective/subjective and of course science/math/ethics are all ways that people have tried to divide up realms of knowledge. The problem is not dividing up realms of knowledge itself--everyone does that because there are real differences between the areas--but when it comes to epistemology, how we know what we know about these realms, I expect the dichotomies to break down. I expect that the way we gain historical knowledge isn't very different from the way we gain scientific knowledge. I expect that the way we gain mathematical knowledge isn't so different from the way we gain scientific or ethical knowledge. That's my hypothesis, in general. It's heavily influenced by Quine and Putnam (and Dewey, through Putnam), I think. At the very least, it's influenced by a misinterpretation of Quine and Putnam.

So, in particular, I expect that the distinctions between how we gain ethical knowledge and how we gain scientific knowledge break down under pressure. I expect that all knowledge is more or less in the same boat. I suspect that the differences are all of quantity, and not quality of knowledge. So I suspect that any attempt to explain why scientific stuff is objective and ethical or mathematical stuff is not eventually breaks down. I think that the indispensability argument goes a good way towards showing how the distinction breaks down between math and science, and I suspect that something similar can be adapted for ethics. I think that there are at least two good, promising ways of doing this, but in the end every way of making the argument does it by trying to make science a little bit more modest.

But I started by saying that there are real differences between math and ethics and science? It's just a fact that there are no ethics laboratories in universities, and it doesn't strike us as a very good idea to start such labs. Why is that? An analogy from math is useful in clarifying the question. Once Quine/Putnam argue that math is actually empirical knowledge and as objectively known as science, they need to answer the question: what fooled people for so long? Why did people think that math was a priori and divorced from experience? So, if you argue that ethics is on the same par as science, you have to explain why ethics strikes people as being the sort of thing that it doesn't make sense to start a lab for.

Of course, you could say that people are wrong, and that we really should be building ethics labs of some sort. Some people--I think that I heard this in the name of Nagel or Parfit--think that ethics is just a young science, one that's bound to develop the way that other sciences have. So maybe these people think that opening ethics labs makes sense. But I'm more sympathetic to the position that there is something about ethics that makes such a notion strange. I guess this could be consistent with the view that we should open labs, but I guess the view I find most attractive is that ethics is really really really hard. (This is also the reason why I'm not swayed by an argument from disagreement that ethics is subjective. Disagreement is consistent not only with subjective views, but also with really really really hard ones.) I bet that I could even show that some things that eventually fell into the realm of science were considered subjective problems, ones that it wouldn't make sense for a lab to study. For example, I bet a lot of brain stuff fits this pattern.

How does this relate to the original program of contrasting math with ethics? Well, the idea is that by taking an argument that's found in the math literature, and seeing how it holds up under ethics we'll be able to see what math and ethics have in common. And my guess is that math and ethics can be both shown to be close to science when it comes to epistemology. And that the differences in the way they have been considered have to do with how hard/easy studying the subject is (math is more objective cuz we're able to isolate variables, ethics is REALLY hard cuz there are so many variables, math is a priori because it's an essential part of the web of beleif, ethics barely seems like knowledge because it's so hard to get secure on it, etc.).

Ethics and Observation, Harman

(I'll explain the cat picture soon enough.)

I'm having great difficulty trying to pin down the difference between the role of observation in ethics and science that Harman describes (in "The Nature of Morality"). Not sure why, but I'm just unable to state the difference between ethics and science with regards to observation in any clear way. Anyway, here's my attempt to formulate it. Hopefully this will help me get closer to understanding it.

Harman's thesis: Observational evidence plays a role in science that it doesn't play in ethics. Specifically, observations can provide evidence for scientific theories, but observations can't provide evidence for ethical theories. Ethics fails to meet the standards of science, then.

So how does observation work in science? Harman begins by telling you how observation doesn't work in science. You might think that science works like this: you, the scientist, observe a new species of animal: looks kinda like a cat, kinda like a horse. It might be tempting to think that you're getting an usullied picture of the world when you make this observation. Like you're just downloading a bunch of data into your brain. But that wouldn't be quite true. Philosophers and psychologists know that this isn't the way that people perceive the world; there's a lot of your preexisting beliefs that go into your perceptions. Put another way, how you think about the world has a lot to do with how you see the world. For example, you need to know what a "box" is before you could possible perceive a box. For another example, suppose you experienced something totally unlike anything that you had experienced before. Would you be able to describe it? So perception is more like receiving processed data than it is receiving straight data. All of our data gets processed in the process of observation.

So does that mean that we should be skeptical of our observations? Why should we think that there is anything behind our observations, if our mind and preexisting beliefs color the way that we look at the world?

The answer, for Harman, is that we have good reason to believe that our observations are true because of inference to the best explanation. What is the best explanation of your observation? And by that I mean, what's the best explanation of the fact that you had the observation that you had? Well, let's list some of the possible explanations of the fact that you had the observation that you had.

(a) You were hallucinating, causing you to have the observation of something that seemed real.
(b) Your theory, your preexisting beliefs, colored the way that you observed the world. What you really saw was something that didn't have the kind of animal you observed, but you interpreted it in that way because of your theory and beliefs.
(c) You actually saw something in the world that looked the way you thought it did.

The best explanation is the third one. So in order to explain the fact that you observed something, we need to infer that you actually did observe something. It's inference to the best explanation.

Now, clearly this is right, but I'm not sure if it all adds up the way I'm describing it. What makes (c) the best explanation? Is it the simplest? What does simple mean? Does simple mean only one sentence long? Is it simpler to assume that you were hallucinating or simpler to assume that you actually saw a new species? By simpler, do we just mean "more likely to happen to a person"? So we assume that people see real stuff all the time, and from that we reason that the best explanation of a phenomenon is that you actually saw something? But that's gonna end up being a bit circular, because what we're interested in knowing is what justifies the thought that we're not hallucinating during observation.

Let me move on to ethics. Ethics, Harman says, is quite unlike science when it comes to observation. So, having told us how science works, we should be able to see that ethics doesn't work that way. Let's give it a shot.

So, Harman discusses the example of an ethical obseravtion. You're walking down the street, and you see a bunch of kids burning a cat (his example, not mine!). You immediately come to the conclusion "It's wrong to burn a cat." Now, you didn't necessarily believe this before you saw it. It might be that life never afforded you the opportunity to consider the case of a cat lynching. So we can call this a full-fledged observation of an ethical fact. Of course, of course, your pre-existing beliefs about what's right and wrong factor into your observation, but that doesn't matter because (as Harman argued above) the case is the same for any observation, including a scientific one. Every obseration is processed through the brain's machinary before coming to your consciousness, whether it's an ethical observation or a scientific one.

Now, in science we said that we have reason to believe that scientific facts are true because they are necessary for providing the best explanation for the fact that you had the observation that you did. Now, let's try this for ethics. What is the best explanation for the fact that you had the ethical obseration that you did, that you observed that it's wrong to burn cats? Here are a couple options:
(a) You actually did perceived something in the world that appears the way that you observed it, that is, you actually managed to perceive/see ethical properties in the world, the same way people observe that a ball is blue or that a tree is tall.
(b) You were "hallucinating." Your experience was that of an observation about something real in the world, but actually it was your brain and beliefs doing all the work.

Around here is where I get stuck. The idea is supposed to be that the best explanation of the fact that you had an ethical observation is (b). And so inference to the best explanation doesn't require any ethical facts to exist. But isn't this just to assume what what we were trying to prove? Oy. Need to get back to this.

Can meat eaters who think they're doing something wrong teach us about metaethics?

I dunno. There are definitely people in the world who think that it's wrong to eat animals but do it anyway. Myself, I come close to it. Louis CK thinks the same thing, and if you don't mind the profanity here's a funny youtube video explaining the point.



OK. So some people are convinced that it's wrong to eat animals, but don't do it. How can this help us?

Some arguments against the objectivity of ethics go like this: if we had objective knowledge about ethics, it would be knowledge about a realm unlike anything else that we have knowledge of. Indeed, objective ethical knowledge would have to be about a realm of ethical objects that share the feature of being able to bring about obligations just through knowing them. That's unlike the rest of our knowledge: I don't immediately get any obligation just from knowing that "That tree is green." So, this knowledge of ethics would have to be unlike any other knowledge. And from here a small jump is taken--we have no secure reason to believe that such knowledge is possible or exists at all, and no reason to think that there are any objects such that knowledge of them leads to any sort of obligation.

So, there are two responses I can think of. The first I mentioned in the previous post, and it's the idea that there are actually lots of objects such that knowledge of or about them leads to obligations of some sort (the obligation to believe certain things, I pointed to in the post).

Another sort of response relates to vegetarianism, and people who think that it's wrong to eat animals but eat animals anyway. If you could get enough examples like this, you could begin to wear away at the notion that knowledge of ethical objects necessarily involves obligations--meaning, if you could know for certain, and securely, that it's wrong to eat animals while still not feeling obligated to stop eating 'em then this would be difficult for the notion that there is something intrinsically queer or weird about ethical knowledge. The weird thing, the obligation, has to come from somewhere else. But you could start to wear away at the strangeness of ethical knowledge, and through this you could resist the argument that ethical knowledge would have to be knowledge about a mysterious, curious and queer domain.

Update: As I think about this, a good analogy would be "I see the evidence, but I can't bring myself to believe it." In both cases reasons are given and recognized, and it's conceded that a rational person would probably act differently, but one doesn't believe the thing that he should, or doesn't do what he ought to. I guess, then, my point is complementary to the previous post. Together, I argue that the situation in ethics isn't so different from truth in general, and there are two responses one can make to the argument from queerness about ethics. One is that oughtness, or ought-to-ness is present in discussions of truth in general just as much as it is in ethics. So it's not queer unless truth is. But the other response is that reasonable people can know stuff about ethics/truth without acting/believing, so that knowledge isn't really knowledge of something that is essentially normative.

You can't derive an "ought" from an "is"

Here's something that we hear all the time: you can't derive an "ought" from an "is." What's an example of this? You can't derive any obligations or requirements from any fact. So, you can't derive an obligation to do something about poverty from the statement "That person is poor." Just from believing that "That tree is causing trouble" you can't derive any ought statement, such as "We ought to cut down that tree" or "We ought not to cut down that tree."

I don't know much about this area of philosophy, but it seems to me that there's a fairly simple counter-example to this. The fact that it seems simple to me is evidence that it's probably wrong, but I'm not sure where the fault is. So if anybody can figure it out, let me know.

So, "truth" has a certain normativity, ought-ness about it, no? If you think that p is true, then you ought to believe p. For example, imagine encountering a person who thought that it was true that the world was round, but believed that the world was flat. What would you be able to say to such a person? You would say: "you don't really believe that it's true that the world is round. Because if you believe that the world is round, you OUGHT to believe that the world isn't flat, that it's round."

So, isn't there a simple "ought" that you can derive from an "is"? Namely, from "I think that p is true" you can derive that "I ought to believe p."

If anyone can tell me where this reasoning fails, I would definitely appreciate it.