Sosa distinguishes between particularism and methodism. Methodism starts by outlining what the correct epistemological methods are, and then checking to see how much knowledge we have given those methods. Most people don't really do that, I don't think. Much more common is particularism in epistemology. This is a methodological starting point; you start with knowledge, and then you attempt to justify and understand what norms and principles give us that knowledge. It's not just an attempt to describe our knowledge, but that description is in fact normative in this case. If it turns out from our study of knowledge that people require observation in order to know stuff, then observation is normative, in the sense that you only ought to believe something if it's been observed. That's the methodology for a lot of epistemology.
You might ask, then, why not do the same thing for ethics? Say that we're assuming that there is ethical knowledge, and that we need to understand how that's possible. Then how we gain that ethical knowledge is normative. Given that we do the same thing for epistemology, how can we distinguish the two?
The obvious difference is that whether there is ethical knowledge is debated. But I suppose if one was quite sure, on a first-person level, that there was ethical knowledge, there's nothing to stop him for proceeding as we do in epistemology. But it certainly won't convince anybody. But it's not aiming to. Just as epistemology often says that it has no need to answer the absolute skeptic, a moral epistemologist could say the same thing. Of course, it won't convince the skeptic, but maybe one doesn't want to. This only works if you are REALLY sure that there is ethical knowledge, but given that someone is this certain then it's hard to think of a way to criticize their methods given that there's an exact parallel methodology in scientific/general epistemology.
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Sunday, November 22, 2009
Metaethics and Philosophy of Religion
Another fruitful parallel? I like when philosophy does this. Here's Plantinga:
Math, religion, ethics all face the same challenge: if I can't sense it, can I really know it? The answer might seem to be no, but the idea that we only believe what we can sense fails horribly. So we try to latch on math, religion or ethics to those principles that guide us when we leave the realm of observation. In math there is the claim that this is enough for numbers (though Parsons raises the objection that is quite parallel to that raised by Enoch towards the naturalist Cornell realists about losing the special nature of math/ethics by resorting to the naturalistic argument). If ethics and religion fails this test, does that mean that they're out? Plantinga says "no" in the case of religion.
If a man believes that the star Sirius has a planetary system containing a planet with mountains over 40,000 feet tall, then if his belief is to be rational or reasonable he must have some reason or evidence for it. Similarly, it may be said, with the existence of God: the theist must be able to answer teh question "How do you know or why do you believe?" if his belief is to be rational; or at any rate there must be a good answer to this question. He needs evidence of some sort or other; he needs some reason for believing. Obviously this raises many questions. What is evidence? What relation holds between a person and a proposition when the person has evidence for the proposition? Must a rational person have evidence or reasons for all of his beliefs? Presumably not. But then what properties must a belief have for a person to be justified in accepting it without evidence? Is a person justified in believing a proposition only if it can be inferred inductively or deductively from incorrigible sensory beliefs? Or propositions that are obvious to common sense and accepted by everyone?
Math, religion, ethics all face the same challenge: if I can't sense it, can I really know it? The answer might seem to be no, but the idea that we only believe what we can sense fails horribly. So we try to latch on math, religion or ethics to those principles that guide us when we leave the realm of observation. In math there is the claim that this is enough for numbers (though Parsons raises the objection that is quite parallel to that raised by Enoch towards the naturalist Cornell realists about losing the special nature of math/ethics by resorting to the naturalistic argument). If ethics and religion fails this test, does that mean that they're out? Plantinga says "no" in the case of religion.
A philosophy of math thought
Almost without fail, when I talk to my math friends about whether mathematical statements are true or false I'm told:
Why isn't this quite right?
First, this avoids answering basic questions about really basic math. Is 2+2=4 true or false? Can we only talk about it being true in Peano's world, or true in ZFC's world, but can't talk about it being absolutely true or false? What explains our choice to study the worlds where 2+2=4 is true instead of false? Is it just by whim? Can we then imagine living in a world where 2+2=5? Or maybe we pick the system because it matches up with our world. But doesn't that mean that we believe that 2+2=4 is really true? In that case we are committed to the existence of actual numbers. And if we want to maintain that there are no such things as number, we then have to explain why we study 2+2=4, and we have to explain why that statement seems to incredibly true about our world.
Second, it evades answering questions about the axioms. How do you choose which axioms to study? Why are we picking some axioms instead of others? If we're picking axioms that properly describe the geometry of earth, does that mean that we're studying something factual when we study that geometry? When it comes to set theory, and the foundations of things like arithmetic, we might be less willing to be wishy washy about which axioms are true. This argument is somewhat dependent on the one right above.
Third, Hilbert tried to be a formalist, but most folks think that he failed because there are tremendous tensions in trying to believe that we just work with a bunch of formal systems that are consistent when these systems can't prove their own consistency.
"Well, it depends what you mean by true or false. Mathematics doesn't make any substantive claims, we just make conditionals. You start with some axioms, and then deduce from there. So all mathematical knowledge is conditional: if the axioms are true, then this deduction is true."
Why isn't this quite right?
First, this avoids answering basic questions about really basic math. Is 2+2=4 true or false? Can we only talk about it being true in Peano's world, or true in ZFC's world, but can't talk about it being absolutely true or false? What explains our choice to study the worlds where 2+2=4 is true instead of false? Is it just by whim? Can we then imagine living in a world where 2+2=5? Or maybe we pick the system because it matches up with our world. But doesn't that mean that we believe that 2+2=4 is really true? In that case we are committed to the existence of actual numbers. And if we want to maintain that there are no such things as number, we then have to explain why we study 2+2=4, and we have to explain why that statement seems to incredibly true about our world.
Second, it evades answering questions about the axioms. How do you choose which axioms to study? Why are we picking some axioms instead of others? If we're picking axioms that properly describe the geometry of earth, does that mean that we're studying something factual when we study that geometry? When it comes to set theory, and the foundations of things like arithmetic, we might be less willing to be wishy washy about which axioms are true. This argument is somewhat dependent on the one right above.
Third, Hilbert tried to be a formalist, but most folks think that he failed because there are tremendous tensions in trying to believe that we just work with a bunch of formal systems that are consistent when these systems can't prove their own consistency.
Explanation and Justification
I'm reading Peter Lipton's book on IBE right now, and it's a good read with nice chapters on induction and explanation.
If you think about it inference to the best explanation is a really interesting principle, if it's used for justification of inferences. Meaning, consider the following: I see water coming out of my wall, the best explanation of this is that a pipe has burst. Therefore I am justified in concluding that a pipe has burst. But what justifies this conclusion? IBE. So inference to the best explanation plays a justifying role. We then ask, "What justifies IBE?" Well, that is what I've been trying to do. Enoch and Shechter give an account of epistemic justification that allows for pragmatic considerations (of a very specific type) to play a role in justifying our basic principles, such as IBE. I think that this runs into problems that are pretty big, but it is a subtle argument with intuitive appeal.
Another attempt, which occurred to me, is to simply take certain beliefs as primitive. IBE is unjustified, or justified by things that it justifies. This suggests a coherentist picture of some sort. Enoch is decidedly working in a foundationalist epistemology, one that thinks that justification is linear and asymmetric.
What else is there? You might think that the notions of explanation and justification are simply linked--maybe the reason why inference to the best explanation is justified is because what you're really doing is inferring to the best justification, so that IBE is never leading you to believe something that isn't justified. But this doesn't work, since explanation is actually quite different from justification. This comes out well in Lipton. One way to see this is that we have a much easier time believing that that certain beliefs explain themselves or dont' require explanations, while it's much harder to come across beliesf that seem to justify themselves, or require no justification. Also, explanation seems to FAR outstrip knowledge. In fact, we only begin to seek an explanation of a fact after we are secure in our knowledge that the fact is true! So it's quite a substantial claim to say that explanation guides justification, as IBE seems to do (I think). Obviously, explanation cannot be all there is to justification. Is explanation a specific type of justification? Er, I'm confused.
If you think about it inference to the best explanation is a really interesting principle, if it's used for justification of inferences. Meaning, consider the following: I see water coming out of my wall, the best explanation of this is that a pipe has burst. Therefore I am justified in concluding that a pipe has burst. But what justifies this conclusion? IBE. So inference to the best explanation plays a justifying role. We then ask, "What justifies IBE?" Well, that is what I've been trying to do. Enoch and Shechter give an account of epistemic justification that allows for pragmatic considerations (of a very specific type) to play a role in justifying our basic principles, such as IBE. I think that this runs into problems that are pretty big, but it is a subtle argument with intuitive appeal.
Another attempt, which occurred to me, is to simply take certain beliefs as primitive. IBE is unjustified, or justified by things that it justifies. This suggests a coherentist picture of some sort. Enoch is decidedly working in a foundationalist epistemology, one that thinks that justification is linear and asymmetric.
What else is there? You might think that the notions of explanation and justification are simply linked--maybe the reason why inference to the best explanation is justified is because what you're really doing is inferring to the best justification, so that IBE is never leading you to believe something that isn't justified. But this doesn't work, since explanation is actually quite different from justification. This comes out well in Lipton. One way to see this is that we have a much easier time believing that that certain beliefs explain themselves or dont' require explanations, while it's much harder to come across beliesf that seem to justify themselves, or require no justification. Also, explanation seems to FAR outstrip knowledge. In fact, we only begin to seek an explanation of a fact after we are secure in our knowledge that the fact is true! So it's quite a substantial claim to say that explanation guides justification, as IBE seems to do (I think). Obviously, explanation cannot be all there is to justification. Is explanation a specific type of justification? Er, I'm confused.
Nearing the half-way point
It's about half way through this project. So how am I feeling about it? I'm having fun, I'm learning a lot, but I'm finding it really hard. Now, I don't mind finding it hard. If philosophy were easy no one would be doing it. The difficulty and seeming insurmountably of a question is almost definitional of a philosophical question. Easy questions don't get asked in philosophy. But that's all a consolation prize--I really would like to have gotten a much better or deeper understanding of something, and I don't think that I've really gotten there yet. If I keep on plugging away will I gain some new insight on the issues that interest me? Maybe yes, maybe no. There's no way to know.
Here's a disappointment: for now my focus is turning away from the intersection of math and ethics and focusing squarely on the intersection of philosophy of science, epistemology and ethics. We'll see how far that goes. But for now it seems as if philosophy of math has been asked to sit this one out. In retrospect, this was a long time coming, since the power of the indispensability argument is its claim to just be a plain-old boring scientific and inductive argument. What makes it so appealing in philosophy of math is that it seems to be completely acceptable to the scientist.
I'm going to keep on reading about philosophy of math on the side, wondering if maybe there isn't some way in which the mathematical platonist goes beyond inference to the best explanation in order to reach his conclusions. And maybe if ethical realism fails, ultimately we can tie mathematical realism to that sinking ship. Anti-realism tends to be far less interesting to me than realism, though. My deeper convictions are that math and ethics are clearly different than plain old empirical knowledge in some important respects, but that they're completely respectable arenas in which disagreements can be rationally voiced and where certain claims are true and others are false. But I'm going to be open here, and if I find an argument that pushes me towards anti-realism, I'll have to deal with that.
In the mean time, here's where the project currently stands. I don't feel too hopeful about where it is right now. I don't believe that I'm on the verge of finding something. But anyway, here it is: inference to the best explanation is a respectable principle. But what justifies inference to the best explanation? Do you need to fall back onto something normative in order to get the whole thing going? Is that any different from just saying that justification is a normative concept through-and-through? And if some sort of normativity is needed in order to justify scientific claims, how much normative theory creeps in? The question is analogous to one in math after the indispensability argument: so math is necessary for science, but how much math? In the same way, maybe some normative theory is necessary for science (in the sense that in order be justified we need normative theory), but how much normative theory? Does moral theory creep in?
I sincerely think that the answer is "no," but this is likely to be the topic of my half-way point paper that I'm writing this week. To be honest, I keep on hoping that I smell a trail that will send me in a slightly different direction. I think that this direction is absolutely fascinating, but I don't think that it's a very promising one for ethics. But here we go, anyway!
Here's a disappointment: for now my focus is turning away from the intersection of math and ethics and focusing squarely on the intersection of philosophy of science, epistemology and ethics. We'll see how far that goes. But for now it seems as if philosophy of math has been asked to sit this one out. In retrospect, this was a long time coming, since the power of the indispensability argument is its claim to just be a plain-old boring scientific and inductive argument. What makes it so appealing in philosophy of math is that it seems to be completely acceptable to the scientist.
I'm going to keep on reading about philosophy of math on the side, wondering if maybe there isn't some way in which the mathematical platonist goes beyond inference to the best explanation in order to reach his conclusions. And maybe if ethical realism fails, ultimately we can tie mathematical realism to that sinking ship. Anti-realism tends to be far less interesting to me than realism, though. My deeper convictions are that math and ethics are clearly different than plain old empirical knowledge in some important respects, but that they're completely respectable arenas in which disagreements can be rationally voiced and where certain claims are true and others are false. But I'm going to be open here, and if I find an argument that pushes me towards anti-realism, I'll have to deal with that.
In the mean time, here's where the project currently stands. I don't feel too hopeful about where it is right now. I don't believe that I'm on the verge of finding something. But anyway, here it is: inference to the best explanation is a respectable principle. But what justifies inference to the best explanation? Do you need to fall back onto something normative in order to get the whole thing going? Is that any different from just saying that justification is a normative concept through-and-through? And if some sort of normativity is needed in order to justify scientific claims, how much normative theory creeps in? The question is analogous to one in math after the indispensability argument: so math is necessary for science, but how much math? In the same way, maybe some normative theory is necessary for science (in the sense that in order be justified we need normative theory), but how much normative theory? Does moral theory creep in?
I sincerely think that the answer is "no," but this is likely to be the topic of my half-way point paper that I'm writing this week. To be honest, I keep on hoping that I smell a trail that will send me in a slightly different direction. I think that this direction is absolutely fascinating, but I don't think that it's a very promising one for ethics. But here we go, anyway!
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Looking at S-M again
So, S-M points out, and let's say that we agree, that some kind of evaluative facts are necessary for inference to the best explanation. Some kind of evidence is better than other kinds, some explanations are better than others. We have value.
Now, I think that it's relatively uncontroversial (though I could be wrong) that we can pass from evaluative facts to normative facts. If evidence is good, then we ought to believe it, it gives us a reason to believe something. I think all of these notions are exchangeable, but I'm just talking about what seems reasonable to me.
So then there are some normative facts, but they're about epistemic value, epistemic normativity.
So let's say that we can show that facts about epistemic value are indispensable to science (because belief in science means belief in IBE, and this commits you to a host of epistemic values that support and sustain IBE). Where does this leave us with ethical facts?
There's an analogy to be drawn from math. Math is indispensable to science, but not all of math. And so some math gets tossed for being fictional (higher set theory, let's say). And some math gets included in order to round off the actually indispensable mathematics. And some math you are committed to just because it is built off, constructed out of the math that's needed for science. It's part of the theory that's needed.
So, if epistemic normativity is indispensable to science (and that's not a given, and that claim needs to be made more precise) then what relation does ethics have to epistemic normativity? Is it part of the same theory (one unified theory of normativity?) Or maybe it supervenes on epistemic normativity--that would be odd. Not sure what that would mean. Or maybe it's needed to round off and make reasonable the epistemic normativity. Or maybe it's completely irrelevant.
Now, I think that it's relatively uncontroversial (though I could be wrong) that we can pass from evaluative facts to normative facts. If evidence is good, then we ought to believe it, it gives us a reason to believe something. I think all of these notions are exchangeable, but I'm just talking about what seems reasonable to me.
So then there are some normative facts, but they're about epistemic value, epistemic normativity.
So let's say that we can show that facts about epistemic value are indispensable to science (because belief in science means belief in IBE, and this commits you to a host of epistemic values that support and sustain IBE). Where does this leave us with ethical facts?
There's an analogy to be drawn from math. Math is indispensable to science, but not all of math. And so some math gets tossed for being fictional (higher set theory, let's say). And some math gets included in order to round off the actually indispensable mathematics. And some math you are committed to just because it is built off, constructed out of the math that's needed for science. It's part of the theory that's needed.
So, if epistemic normativity is indispensable to science (and that's not a given, and that claim needs to be made more precise) then what relation does ethics have to epistemic normativity? Is it part of the same theory (one unified theory of normativity?) Or maybe it supervenes on epistemic normativity--that would be odd. Not sure what that would mean. Or maybe it's needed to round off and make reasonable the epistemic normativity. Or maybe it's completely irrelevant.
Random thoughts
Hit a bit of a wall, trying to feel my way forward. Here's some random thoughts:
More problems with Enoch
Enoch writes, "Instances of inference to the best explanation are justified, then, because they are arguments from indispensability to the explanatory project, which is essentially unavoidable." In another paper, he writes "Employing IBE is needed for successfully engaging in the explanatory project, and this explains why we are justified in employing IBE as a basic rule in our thought."
So IBE is justified for the sake of our explanatory project. But does that allow us to use IBE when we are not seeking an explanation. Sometimes we seek knowledge because we're interested in explaining things. This is, quite plausibly, what is motivating much of scientific investigation. But don't we also seek knowledge for many reasons besides explanation? I want to know what's causing my ceiling to be dripping water. I employ IBE to infer that it's because there is a pipe that is burst. But my use of IBE is only justified for the sake of the explanatory project. Is it so clear that I am justified in using it in this context, which has nothing to do with explanation? This project is quite optional; I could just give it up. Shouldn't I only infer to the best explanation when failing to do so would undermine the explanatory project? A response could be that if I don't always infer to the best explanation, then I'm failing to truly engage in the explanatory project. But isn't that claim just the claim that I must be seeking explanations at all times? So let's refine what we're saying: it would seem inconsistent to employ IBE sometimes and fail to use IBE at other times. But what's at issue is not our use of IBE, but our evaluation of when such use is justified and when it is not. But maybe I'm still missing the point. Maybe once IBE is justified once, it's justified in every context. But this makes the justification of IBE mysterious. If we only need to justify IBE in certain contexts, why should we overextend ourselves?
Also, here's a way to present their argument:
(1) What we mean by epistemic justification is "being epistemically responsible."
(2) If we are in a situation where "if the method is not effective the relevant rationally required project is doomed to systematic failure" then it is epistemically reponsible, and hence epistemically justified, to believe that the method is effective.
(3) The explanatory project is rationally required, and is doomed to failure if IBE is not effective.
(4) We are epistemically justified in believing in IBE.
Sayre-McCord
What does he mean? Here's a quote from "Explanatory Impotence":
The only way that I can make sense of this (given that his example is WILDLY IMPLAUSIBLE, as he himself acknowledges) is to be doing something like Enoch actually does. Enoch thinks that he's working in this spirit, I think, given what he says about S-M in his thesis. It's as good an explanation as any.
There's one argument in S-M that I want to dismiss. He writes "Once it has been granted that some explanations are better than others, many obstacles to a defense of moral values disappear. In fact, all general objections to the existence of value must be rejected as too strong."
Here's Field explaining why I don't like S-M's argument:
So we can have objections to the existence of epistemic values even if we decide, in the end, to embrace them in our ontology. And that means that those objections could still stand against moral values.
Other stuff
Explanation runs out well before justification does. There doesn't seem to be regress problems with explanation, because there are some statements that really really don't seem to need explanation. This is easier to argue for than the claim that there are statements that don't need justification. For example, does IBE need explanation? Is there anything mysterious about that? No, I don't think so. But it does need justification. This is a fairly obvious point, but one that I enjoyed making explicit. Also, note that being an explanation doesn't seem to have anything to do with justification. Only best explanations have anything to do with justification. I take this to be an indication that justification is a normative concept, but that has been argued for by others and needs more argument than I just gave.
An ontological argument for our best explanations being justified:
(1) One of our explanations is the best explanation.
(2) An explanation is worse if belief in it is unjustified.
(3) Belief in our best explanation is justified.
There's a bunch of flaws in here, but it's kinda cute. Wrong, but cute.
More problems with Enoch
Enoch writes, "Instances of inference to the best explanation are justified, then, because they are arguments from indispensability to the explanatory project, which is essentially unavoidable." In another paper, he writes "Employing IBE is needed for successfully engaging in the explanatory project, and this explains why we are justified in employing IBE as a basic rule in our thought."
So IBE is justified for the sake of our explanatory project. But does that allow us to use IBE when we are not seeking an explanation. Sometimes we seek knowledge because we're interested in explaining things. This is, quite plausibly, what is motivating much of scientific investigation. But don't we also seek knowledge for many reasons besides explanation? I want to know what's causing my ceiling to be dripping water. I employ IBE to infer that it's because there is a pipe that is burst. But my use of IBE is only justified for the sake of the explanatory project. Is it so clear that I am justified in using it in this context, which has nothing to do with explanation? This project is quite optional; I could just give it up. Shouldn't I only infer to the best explanation when failing to do so would undermine the explanatory project? A response could be that if I don't always infer to the best explanation, then I'm failing to truly engage in the explanatory project. But isn't that claim just the claim that I must be seeking explanations at all times? So let's refine what we're saying: it would seem inconsistent to employ IBE sometimes and fail to use IBE at other times. But what's at issue is not our use of IBE, but our evaluation of when such use is justified and when it is not. But maybe I'm still missing the point. Maybe once IBE is justified once, it's justified in every context. But this makes the justification of IBE mysterious. If we only need to justify IBE in certain contexts, why should we overextend ourselves?
Also, here's a way to present their argument:
(1) What we mean by epistemic justification is "being epistemically responsible."
(2) If we are in a situation where "if the method is not effective the relevant rationally required project is doomed to systematic failure" then it is epistemically reponsible, and hence epistemically justified, to believe that the method is effective.
(3) The explanatory project is rationally required, and is doomed to failure if IBE is not effective.
(4) We are epistemically justified in believing in IBE.
Sayre-McCord
Still another reply, compatible with the first two but relying specifically on neither, shifts attention from science and from mathematics and logic, to epistemology itself. To think of any set of considerations that they justify some conclusion is to make a claim concerning the value (albeit the epistemic as opposed to moral value) of a conclusion. To hold of science, or mathematics, or logic, that there is a difference between good evidence or good arguments and bad ones is again to commit oneself evaluatively. This raises an obvious question: under what conditions, and why, are epistemic claims reasonably thought justified? Whatever answer one might begin to offer will immediately provide a model for an answer to the parallel question raised about moral judgments. There is no guarantee, of course, that our moral judgments will then end up being justified. The epistemic standards epistemology meets might well not be met by moral theory. But there is good reason to think the kinds of consideration that are appropriate to judging epistemic principles will be appropriate too when it comes to judging other normative principles, including those that we might recognize as moral. This means that any quick dismissal of moral theory as obviously not the sort of thing that could really be justified are almost surely too quick.
What does he mean? Here's a quote from "Explanatory Impotence":
To take one (optimistic) example: Imagine that we justify believing in some property by apeal to its role in our best explanation of some observations, and we the njustify our belief that some explanation is the best available by appeal to our standards of explanatory quality, and finally, we justify these standards by appealing to their ultimate contribution to the maximization of expected utility. Imagine, also, tha thaving justified our standards of explanatory value, we turn to the justification for cultivating some moral property...we might justify these benefits by appeal to their maximizing expected utility.
The only way that I can make sense of this (given that his example is WILDLY IMPLAUSIBLE, as he himself acknowledges) is to be doing something like Enoch actually does. Enoch thinks that he's working in this spirit, I think, given what he says about S-M in his thesis. It's as good an explanation as any.
There's one argument in S-M that I want to dismiss. He writes "Once it has been granted that some explanations are better than others, many obstacles to a defense of moral values disappear. In fact, all general objections to the existence of value must be rejected as too strong."
Here's Field explaining why I don't like S-M's argument:
Justification is not an all or nothing affair. The belief in mathematical entities raises some problems which I and many others believe to be fairly serious. These puzzles provide reasons against the belief in mathematical entities, and to put it very crudely what we must do is weight the reasons for and the reasons against in deciding what to believe.
So we can have objections to the existence of epistemic values even if we decide, in the end, to embrace them in our ontology. And that means that those objections could still stand against moral values.
Other stuff
Explanation runs out well before justification does. There doesn't seem to be regress problems with explanation, because there are some statements that really really don't seem to need explanation. This is easier to argue for than the claim that there are statements that don't need justification. For example, does IBE need explanation? Is there anything mysterious about that? No, I don't think so. But it does need justification. This is a fairly obvious point, but one that I enjoyed making explicit. Also, note that being an explanation doesn't seem to have anything to do with justification. Only best explanations have anything to do with justification. I take this to be an indication that justification is a normative concept, but that has been argued for by others and needs more argument than I just gave.
An ontological argument for our best explanations being justified:
(1) One of our explanations is the best explanation.
(2) An explanation is worse if belief in it is unjustified.
(3) Belief in our best explanation is justified.
There's a bunch of flaws in here, but it's kinda cute. Wrong, but cute.
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