I'm actually just starting this one. Here's the introduction, anyway:
In the first chapter I argued that there are no possible epistemic reasons to doubt epistemic realism. The second chapter argued that being an epistemic realist involves a degree of arbitrariness. Despite this potential arbitrariness, the vast majority of people are committed to pretty much the same epistemology. The moral realist, however, can take advantage of this potential for unobjectionable arbitrariness by choosing an epistemology that is sympathetic towards his realism. This only allows the realist to get his foot in the door, however, since the anti-realist objects that there are tensions internal to the realist’s epistemology. Presumably, the moral realist is not willing to dissociate himself from most of the world by radically revising his epistemic principles to line up with his realism. This means that his only available option is to disarm the anti-realist objections so that the tension internal to his epistemology is eliminated.
In this thesis I am not up to the task of defending moral realism against all the anti-realist objections. Instead, I will focus on one powerful anti-realist objection, the reliability challenge. This objection alleges that the moral realist is unable to explain how it is that so many of his moral beliefs turn out to be true. I focus on this objection for two reasons. First, it is considered by many to be the most disturbing objection to moral realism. Second, because I believe that reflecting on how the objection might apply to epistemology can help us gain perspective on the problem.
I will conclude this chapter, and the thesis, hoping to have convinced the reader of two things. First, that my approach towards a defense of moral realism is a promising one for the realist. Second, that continued reflection on epistemology is capable of yielding considerable insight on ethics.
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
Hashing out the third chapter
Now we're two down, one to go. This one is going to be particularly difficult, since I basically need to write it on the fly. In other words, the first two chapters are ideas that I've had for a while, written down in various versions and refined over the course of weeks and months. The content of this third chapter...not so much. Tomorrow's the day, though, and before I call it a night I want to think a bit about where this chapter's going.
I concluded the previous chapter by stating that what remains for the moral realist is to show that his view doesn't conflict with the rest of our/his epistemology. One of the anti-realist argumens that he faces is the reliability challenge. Properly adjusted, however, and a similar argument applies to epistemology.
So, here's the plan of the final chapter: Start by discussing what remains for the moral realist to do. Establish a properly adjusted parity argument for epistemology and ethics. Outline different responses from realists that have come so far, showing that they weren't always answering the right question (ala Enoch), and then offer my own perspective. I'm a bit nervous about offering my own perspective, since my own perspective hasnt been written down clearly ever, but my idea is that we can swallow our pride and just admit that there is a sort of miracle going on here. But the sort of crazy coincidence that we have to assume is fairly limited--it's that our intuitions aren't that far off. You have to do that if you're going to have any knowledge anyway, since a certain kind of skeptical concern is always possible. In a way, my argument is that this is that this is the input that produces the realist output; the input is the faith that our intuitions aren't wildly divergent with the way that the world actually is.
I concluded the previous chapter by stating that what remains for the moral realist is to show that his view doesn't conflict with the rest of our/his epistemology. One of the anti-realist argumens that he faces is the reliability challenge. Properly adjusted, however, and a similar argument applies to epistemology.
So, here's the plan of the final chapter: Start by discussing what remains for the moral realist to do. Establish a properly adjusted parity argument for epistemology and ethics. Outline different responses from realists that have come so far, showing that they weren't always answering the right question (ala Enoch), and then offer my own perspective. I'm a bit nervous about offering my own perspective, since my own perspective hasnt been written down clearly ever, but my idea is that we can swallow our pride and just admit that there is a sort of miracle going on here. But the sort of crazy coincidence that we have to assume is fairly limited--it's that our intuitions aren't that far off. You have to do that if you're going to have any knowledge anyway, since a certain kind of skeptical concern is always possible. In a way, my argument is that this is that this is the input that produces the realist output; the input is the faith that our intuitions aren't wildly divergent with the way that the world actually is.
Chapter Two...
...is almost done. Here's the introduction:
In the previous chapter I argued that belief in epistemic realism is epistemically optional. From this point on, I will assume that there are objective facts corresponding to what epistemic reasons we have. In this chapter I will discuss the search for these facts. My focus will be on the question, how do we know which epistemic facts to accept? How do we know that Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a good principle of belief-formation, and that Inference to the Worst Explanation (IWE) is not? Presumably, we need some further epistemic principle to guide us. What, then, guides us towards that further principle?
I will argue that there is an ineliminable arbitrariness in our epistemic theories. The point can be put in the following way: it might be that—given a fixed set of epistemic principles and norms—all of one’s beliefs will turn out to be justified. Nevertheless, there is no way to provide a reason to accept any particular one of these fixed sets of principles and norms. There are always some elements of a theory that are the result of arbitrary choice, and I will call these aspects the “elemental aspects” of an epistemic theory. I call them “elemental” because commitment to them determines the composition of one’s epistemic theory by way of eliminating degrees of freedom. Choice of elemental aspects of one’s epistemology, however, is ungoverned by epistemology.
If epistemology is somewhat arbitrary, what constraints are there on any given set of principles? Is there nothing wrong with believing IWE? The answer is that there is something wrong with believing IWE, but only within some fixed epistemology. Given a certain epistemology, one’s epistemic principles need to obey one’s own internal standards and norms. What explains what is problematic about IWE is that it conflicts with the internal standards that most of us share.
The upshot of this discussion for moral realism is that since there is a degree of arbitrariness in choice of epistemology, there is nothing objectionable with taking on an epistemology that is sympathetic to moral beliefs, as long as it does not conflict with the rest of one’s epistemic principles and beliefs. Of course, this doesn’t remove the responsibility from the moral realist of disarming the anti-realist objections to his view. But the moral realist needs to do that anyway. Once one looks at things in this way, one recognizes that this is all that the moral realist needs to do. The burden of proof, I will argue, is decisively shifted away from the realist.
In the previous chapter I argued that belief in epistemic realism is epistemically optional. From this point on, I will assume that there are objective facts corresponding to what epistemic reasons we have. In this chapter I will discuss the search for these facts. My focus will be on the question, how do we know which epistemic facts to accept? How do we know that Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a good principle of belief-formation, and that Inference to the Worst Explanation (IWE) is not? Presumably, we need some further epistemic principle to guide us. What, then, guides us towards that further principle?
I will argue that there is an ineliminable arbitrariness in our epistemic theories. The point can be put in the following way: it might be that—given a fixed set of epistemic principles and norms—all of one’s beliefs will turn out to be justified. Nevertheless, there is no way to provide a reason to accept any particular one of these fixed sets of principles and norms. There are always some elements of a theory that are the result of arbitrary choice, and I will call these aspects the “elemental aspects” of an epistemic theory. I call them “elemental” because commitment to them determines the composition of one’s epistemic theory by way of eliminating degrees of freedom. Choice of elemental aspects of one’s epistemology, however, is ungoverned by epistemology.
If epistemology is somewhat arbitrary, what constraints are there on any given set of principles? Is there nothing wrong with believing IWE? The answer is that there is something wrong with believing IWE, but only within some fixed epistemology. Given a certain epistemology, one’s epistemic principles need to obey one’s own internal standards and norms. What explains what is problematic about IWE is that it conflicts with the internal standards that most of us share.
The upshot of this discussion for moral realism is that since there is a degree of arbitrariness in choice of epistemology, there is nothing objectionable with taking on an epistemology that is sympathetic to moral beliefs, as long as it does not conflict with the rest of one’s epistemic principles and beliefs. Of course, this doesn’t remove the responsibility from the moral realist of disarming the anti-realist objections to his view. But the moral realist needs to do that anyway. Once one looks at things in this way, one recognizes that this is all that the moral realist needs to do. The burden of proof, I will argue, is decisively shifted away from the realist.
One more restatement
I'm trying to get this as crisp as possible in my mind:
Chapter 1: You can't eliminate epistemic normativity through reason.
Chapter 2: There are unjustified epistemic beliefs, so why not build moral realism into them.
Chapter 3: The reliability challenge against moral realism is just the reliability challenge against epistemology, and answering both involves nothing but the faith that we're not massively deceived.
Chapter 1: You can't eliminate epistemic normativity through reason.
Chapter 2: There are unjustified epistemic beliefs, so why not build moral realism into them.
Chapter 3: The reliability challenge against moral realism is just the reliability challenge against epistemology, and answering both involves nothing but the faith that we're not massively deceived.
Monday, March 15, 2010
Chapter One
I just finished a full draft of my first chapter. Here's the introduction:
I believe that there can be no epistemic reason for believing or rejecting epistemic realism. As a consequence, belief in realism is epistemically optional and it is impossible to criticize someone on epistemic grounds for being an realist. My primary goal in this chapter is to defend this claim. Here’s my plan of attack: I begin by presenting epistemic realism and anti-realism. Anti-realists typically believe that they have objections to epistemic realism; indeed, this is what motivates their views. I will argue that the anti-realists are wrong to believe that there are reasons to reject epistemic realism, because it is impossible to have such a reason.
I then discuss an argument offered by Terence Cuneo in his book, “The Normative Web.” He argues for moral realism, on the grounds that any objection against moral realism applies with equal strength to epistemic realism. Drawing on the conclusions I reach in the earlier parts of the chapter, I will argue that since there are no reasons for or against epistemic realism, Cuneo’s argument is flawed.
Epistemic realists shouldn’t get too excited, though, since I will also argue there aren’t any good epistemic reasons for the realist view. What this means is that belief in epistemic realism is epistemically optional. Most beliefs are governed by epistemic norms; epistemic realism isn’t. It is above the epistemic fray, so to speak.
I believe that there can be no epistemic reason for believing or rejecting epistemic realism. As a consequence, belief in realism is epistemically optional and it is impossible to criticize someone on epistemic grounds for being an realist. My primary goal in this chapter is to defend this claim. Here’s my plan of attack: I begin by presenting epistemic realism and anti-realism. Anti-realists typically believe that they have objections to epistemic realism; indeed, this is what motivates their views. I will argue that the anti-realists are wrong to believe that there are reasons to reject epistemic realism, because it is impossible to have such a reason.
I then discuss an argument offered by Terence Cuneo in his book, “The Normative Web.” He argues for moral realism, on the grounds that any objection against moral realism applies with equal strength to epistemic realism. Drawing on the conclusions I reach in the earlier parts of the chapter, I will argue that since there are no reasons for or against epistemic realism, Cuneo’s argument is flawed.
Epistemic realists shouldn’t get too excited, though, since I will also argue there aren’t any good epistemic reasons for the realist view. What this means is that belief in epistemic realism is epistemically optional. Most beliefs are governed by epistemic norms; epistemic realism isn’t. It is above the epistemic fray, so to speak.
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