Saturday, December 4, 2010
A random thought on philosophy
Here's a good way of getting at the difference between bad philosophy and good philosophy. Bad philosophy strips away the insight from fundamental questions and leaves behind a stack of uninteresting details. Good philosophy, on the other hand, is able to take a stack of seemingly uninteresting details and reveal how they determine matters of fundamental interest.
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
Clarification on Correlation
Here's something that I think is true. Hume notes that we can never observe causation in the world, rather we can only observe "constant conjunction." What does this mean? Suppose that your picture of human observation is that we can download an image of the world apart from the concepts that we apply to it.
Let me use an example to illustrate this: I think that apples are tasty. When I see an apple, I think "Damn, that apple is tasty." Does this mean that I'm observing tastiness in the world? Quite plausibly, no, it doesn't. Instead, what I'm doing is observing the apple and once my brain knows that the apple is tasty it applies "tastiness" to it. Contrast this with my actual observation of the apple's presence with my hand. With my hand I sense it's firmness, it's smoothness and this tells me that the apple is extended in space and of a certain texture. Now, does this work like tastiness? That is, do I first observe the apple and then apply to the apple the properties of "extended in space" or "firm"? No, this doesn't seem quite right. Rather, what I'm directly observing is that it fills my hands or pushes back when I squeeze.
(Of course, you might disagree. You might be Kant, for instance, and think that we only observe the world through the a priori categories. Or you might disagree in many other ways.)
The point in the above example is something close to what Hume wants (this is contingent on my memory of Hume from my freshman year course is true). That is, there are some things that we observe directly in the world--primary qualities or something--and there are things that we apply to our observations in the world.
Causation belongs to the second category according to Hume. His argument, if I recall, relies on his specific empiricist theory on the origins of knowledge (that it must have its source through the senses or through something like the analytic manipulation of concepts, and the source of all concepts is from experience, and the way that concepts are gained from experience is that there is a picture of what you experience in your thoughts [I think this is something close to what he says...I need a refresher.]) But we can make the point on our own way too. Take a billiard ball hitting another billiard ball. A very reasonable thing to say is that the first billiard ball caused the second billiard ball to move. Without a doubt, this is very reasonable. But how do we know this? From experience? What experience? The experience that other billiard balls cause other billiard balls to move? That certainly won't do, because it's clearly circular. So instead we want to say something such as, we know that Ball1 caused Ball2 to move because whenever we see Ball1 collide with Ball2, Ball2 moves. This gets more clear on the point--what we really observe is just a collision event; causation is more like tastiness, something that our faculty of reason applies to the observation. Just as my mind applies "tasty" to applies, my mind applies "caused" to a collision event. And even if Ball1 collides in this way with Ball2 many times and each time Ball2 moves, all we have is more of the same collision observation. For Hume, it's unclear where causation gets in.
All of this is to say that I realized that I usually tell this story wrong, both to myself and to others. I usually say that the difference is between causation and correlation, even though I know that Hume talks not about correlation, but rather "constant conjunction." I realized today that there's an important difference here. I think that Hume would probably say that correlation, as we use the term today, is just like causation in being outside of observation.
Correlation refers to a trend, or a tendency for two things to go along together. When I took a statistical inference seminar what the teacher reminded us is that there's alternate explanations for a correlation between two events, other than one causing the other. For instance, one further event might cause both of these events. Or something like that.
Another alternative is that it could be some sort of coincidence that these two events occur with each other all the time. In such an event, the proper thing to say is that there is actually no real correlation between the two events. Rather, there has been some sort of mistake--maybe a sampling error, leading us to think that these two events go together, when in fact they do not. In such a case the proper thing might be to say that there was just a coincidence when we observed these two events occuring together.
My point is that this is what Hume needs. His point is that all we see are coincidences, snapshots of the world as it is at a particular moment, not extended through time and not extended through space. All we have in experience are a series of unrelated flash-frames of the world, and all you get are coincidences, and you can't know causation through experience. But I think that also means that you can't get correlation either.
(Another way of getting to this point much more quickly: Hume also famously argues that we have no empirical grounds for believing in induction. How can you establish a correlation without relying on induction?)
Let me use an example to illustrate this: I think that apples are tasty. When I see an apple, I think "Damn, that apple is tasty." Does this mean that I'm observing tastiness in the world? Quite plausibly, no, it doesn't. Instead, what I'm doing is observing the apple and once my brain knows that the apple is tasty it applies "tastiness" to it. Contrast this with my actual observation of the apple's presence with my hand. With my hand I sense it's firmness, it's smoothness and this tells me that the apple is extended in space and of a certain texture. Now, does this work like tastiness? That is, do I first observe the apple and then apply to the apple the properties of "extended in space" or "firm"? No, this doesn't seem quite right. Rather, what I'm directly observing is that it fills my hands or pushes back when I squeeze.
(Of course, you might disagree. You might be Kant, for instance, and think that we only observe the world through the a priori categories. Or you might disagree in many other ways.)
The point in the above example is something close to what Hume wants (this is contingent on my memory of Hume from my freshman year course is true). That is, there are some things that we observe directly in the world--primary qualities or something--and there are things that we apply to our observations in the world.
Causation belongs to the second category according to Hume. His argument, if I recall, relies on his specific empiricist theory on the origins of knowledge (that it must have its source through the senses or through something like the analytic manipulation of concepts, and the source of all concepts is from experience, and the way that concepts are gained from experience is that there is a picture of what you experience in your thoughts [I think this is something close to what he says...I need a refresher.]) But we can make the point on our own way too. Take a billiard ball hitting another billiard ball. A very reasonable thing to say is that the first billiard ball caused the second billiard ball to move. Without a doubt, this is very reasonable. But how do we know this? From experience? What experience? The experience that other billiard balls cause other billiard balls to move? That certainly won't do, because it's clearly circular. So instead we want to say something such as, we know that Ball1 caused Ball2 to move because whenever we see Ball1 collide with Ball2, Ball2 moves. This gets more clear on the point--what we really observe is just a collision event; causation is more like tastiness, something that our faculty of reason applies to the observation. Just as my mind applies "tasty" to applies, my mind applies "caused" to a collision event. And even if Ball1 collides in this way with Ball2 many times and each time Ball2 moves, all we have is more of the same collision observation. For Hume, it's unclear where causation gets in.
All of this is to say that I realized that I usually tell this story wrong, both to myself and to others. I usually say that the difference is between causation and correlation, even though I know that Hume talks not about correlation, but rather "constant conjunction." I realized today that there's an important difference here. I think that Hume would probably say that correlation, as we use the term today, is just like causation in being outside of observation.
Correlation refers to a trend, or a tendency for two things to go along together. When I took a statistical inference seminar what the teacher reminded us is that there's alternate explanations for a correlation between two events, other than one causing the other. For instance, one further event might cause both of these events. Or something like that.
Another alternative is that it could be some sort of coincidence that these two events occur with each other all the time. In such an event, the proper thing to say is that there is actually no real correlation between the two events. Rather, there has been some sort of mistake--maybe a sampling error, leading us to think that these two events go together, when in fact they do not. In such a case the proper thing might be to say that there was just a coincidence when we observed these two events occuring together.
My point is that this is what Hume needs. His point is that all we see are coincidences, snapshots of the world as it is at a particular moment, not extended through time and not extended through space. All we have in experience are a series of unrelated flash-frames of the world, and all you get are coincidences, and you can't know causation through experience. But I think that also means that you can't get correlation either.
(Another way of getting to this point much more quickly: Hume also famously argues that we have no empirical grounds for believing in induction. How can you establish a correlation without relying on induction?)
Sunday, May 9, 2010
This is silly.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-harris/a-science-of-morality_b_567185.html
Why is this debate happening between a pop intellectual figure and a physicist? Why is Sam Harris attempting to do moral philosophy without any training or background, and why is he engaging with the philosophical thought of a physicist (however cogent) instead of the experts in moral philosophy? Would he consider calling a really-smart philosopher to discuss the implications of physics or neuroscience?
I can think of a couple of explanations for this:
1) Sam Harris thinks that philosophy is easy. So he can do it.
2) Sam Harris thinks that philosophers are stupid.
3) Sam Harris is completely ignorant of philosophy.
I have to admit, I'm a little bit confused by the fact that people take him seriously. Sam Harris seems like a fool, as far as I can tell, and it makes me wonder whether I'm just wrong in my evaluation of him. But if I'm not wrong, then some philosophers should put him in his place. Korsgaard, please?
Why is this debate happening between a pop intellectual figure and a physicist? Why is Sam Harris attempting to do moral philosophy without any training or background, and why is he engaging with the philosophical thought of a physicist (however cogent) instead of the experts in moral philosophy? Would he consider calling a really-smart philosopher to discuss the implications of physics or neuroscience?
I can think of a couple of explanations for this:
1) Sam Harris thinks that philosophy is easy. So he can do it.
2) Sam Harris thinks that philosophers are stupid.
3) Sam Harris is completely ignorant of philosophy.
I have to admit, I'm a little bit confused by the fact that people take him seriously. Sam Harris seems like a fool, as far as I can tell, and it makes me wonder whether I'm just wrong in my evaluation of him. But if I'm not wrong, then some philosophers should put him in his place. Korsgaard, please?
Outlne of the main argument of "Self-Constitution"
As far as I can tell, this is Korsgaard's picture of things
1. "Every object and activity is defined by certain standards that are both constitutive of it and normative for it." (32) For activities, a standard is called a constitutive principle in the case that "if you are not guided by the principle, you are not performing the activity at all." (28)
2. "The function of an action is to constitute an agent." (82)
3. "The function of an action is to render one efficacious and autonomous" (83). This is because being efficacious and autonomous are constitutive standards for being an agent.
4. In addition, "It is essential [/constitutive] to the concept of agency that the agent be unified" (18) This is because "in order to be autonomous, it is essential that your movements be caused by you." (213)
5. In the case of humans, unifying one's agency (through deliberation) is work that needs to be done before any self-conscious action is possible.
6. Justice is how we unify our own agency, and so "Platonic justice is a constitutive principle of action." This is identical to the categorical imperative (213).
7. All of this assures that one will be inwardly just. But one who is inwardly just will be outwardly just as well, since reasons the kind of unity you need is a unity not just of your person, but a kind of unity that counts the reasons of everyone, ala Nagel.
1. "Every object and activity is defined by certain standards that are both constitutive of it and normative for it." (32) For activities, a standard is called a constitutive principle in the case that "if you are not guided by the principle, you are not performing the activity at all." (28)
2. "The function of an action is to constitute an agent." (82)
3. "The function of an action is to render one efficacious and autonomous" (83). This is because being efficacious and autonomous are constitutive standards for being an agent.
4. In addition, "It is essential [/constitutive] to the concept of agency that the agent be unified" (18) This is because "in order to be autonomous, it is essential that your movements be caused by you." (213)
5. In the case of humans, unifying one's agency (through deliberation) is work that needs to be done before any self-conscious action is possible.
6. Justice is how we unify our own agency, and so "Platonic justice is a constitutive principle of action." This is identical to the categorical imperative (213).
7. All of this assures that one will be inwardly just. But one who is inwardly just will be outwardly just as well, since reasons the kind of unity you need is a unity not just of your person, but a kind of unity that counts the reasons of everyone, ala Nagel.
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Is epistemic anti-realism really the same thing as losing the authority of a system of norms? I know that this isn't obvious, and I haven't accepted it naively. The worry is that it isn't. That you can still accept a norm while independently questioning its metaphysical status--that these are just entirely different things.
I don't think that they are, though. As usual, I start with Epistemic Nihilism. If you think that there are no epistemic norms then it's hard to see why you should believe an argument for epistemic nihilism--that's my main argument. I think that nihilism can't help but make practical recommendations--you lose epistemology as a source of authority if there really are no epistemic norms. It's similar to saying that the teacher isn't a fount of reasons. It's the same with epistemic nihilism--epistemology isn't a fount of reasons. You don't actually have reason to believe anything. I take this case to be fairly strong.
And what about other forms of anti-realism? I think that this is a somewhat controversial claim, but that from the realist's perspective this isn't what epistemology means. Hmm...now that I write that I realize that there's something unclear there. Am I resting on the normativity of the meaning of epistemology? Am I saying that for the realist "epistemology" means something different than it does for the expressivist? A little bit. But if so this is kinda weird. The expressivist and the realist aren't even talking about the same domain? That doesn't sound right. Anyway, metaphysical status of norms should be independent of the identification of those norms, in the same way realists about numbers are talking about the same numbers as fictionalists.
So let me try that again. It's not about what epistemology means. It's rather about the reasons that the realist accepts. The realist doesn't accept the expressivist's reasons. Now, this isn't quite right either, because it's the same reasons for both--it's just the metaphysical status of those reasons that is in question.
OK, so let me try this one more time. The issue is whether the expressivist (or any other anti-realist) can give the realist reasons that the realist will respect. On the one hand, yes, they can. They can offer reasons to believe various things, and the realist will interpret them in a certain way, and they will interpret what they are doing in a different way. But all of this is only helpful to the extent that the realist is able to interpret the reason in a realist way. If she can't, then how can we expect her to respect it? It's not the sort of thing she recognizes as having force. Oy, this is problematic too because reasons aren't the sort of thing you choose to respect. I'm not sure. OK.
I don't think that they are, though. As usual, I start with Epistemic Nihilism. If you think that there are no epistemic norms then it's hard to see why you should believe an argument for epistemic nihilism--that's my main argument. I think that nihilism can't help but make practical recommendations--you lose epistemology as a source of authority if there really are no epistemic norms. It's similar to saying that the teacher isn't a fount of reasons. It's the same with epistemic nihilism--epistemology isn't a fount of reasons. You don't actually have reason to believe anything. I take this case to be fairly strong.
And what about other forms of anti-realism? I think that this is a somewhat controversial claim, but that from the realist's perspective this isn't what epistemology means. Hmm...now that I write that I realize that there's something unclear there. Am I resting on the normativity of the meaning of epistemology? Am I saying that for the realist "epistemology" means something different than it does for the expressivist? A little bit. But if so this is kinda weird. The expressivist and the realist aren't even talking about the same domain? That doesn't sound right. Anyway, metaphysical status of norms should be independent of the identification of those norms, in the same way realists about numbers are talking about the same numbers as fictionalists.
So let me try that again. It's not about what epistemology means. It's rather about the reasons that the realist accepts. The realist doesn't accept the expressivist's reasons. Now, this isn't quite right either, because it's the same reasons for both--it's just the metaphysical status of those reasons that is in question.
OK, so let me try this one more time. The issue is whether the expressivist (or any other anti-realist) can give the realist reasons that the realist will respect. On the one hand, yes, they can. They can offer reasons to believe various things, and the realist will interpret them in a certain way, and they will interpret what they are doing in a different way. But all of this is only helpful to the extent that the realist is able to interpret the reason in a realist way. If she can't, then how can we expect her to respect it? It's not the sort of thing she recognizes as having force. Oy, this is problematic too because reasons aren't the sort of thing you choose to respect. I'm not sure. OK.
Monday, May 3, 2010
Parsimony and Burden of Proof
As I reread my thesis in preparation for my oral exam tomorrow, I'm particularly struck by a poorly thought out argument in the second chapter.
In short, the argument was that the burden of proof could be shifted away from the moral realist by noting there is an unavoidable arbitrariness in epistemology. The problem with this argument is that it doesn't really respond to the parsimony requirement, as provide a route for avoiding it. That wasn't the clearest sentence I've written in my life, so let me try again.
The problem for the Moral Realist is that parsimony requires that we don't believe that which we have no good reason to believe. And the response I offer, essentially, says that there are some cases in which parsimony isn't required. There's actually no parsimony requirement for our most basic beliefs.
Here are a couple concerns with this argument:
1) Does this mean that ANYTHING can avoid the parsimony requirement? Why only things like moral realism, treating our moral intuitions as ways of getting at moral facts?
Well, not anything. It's just that some epistemic beliefs/principles are prior to the parsimony requirement. They just happen to avoid it.
2) That's not going to cut it as a response. What if we took the parsimony requirement to be our first, most basic epistemic principle?
Then there's no room for epistemology, and you can't get going. You need to take some things on without having epistemic reason to if you're going to get anything at all.
3) What happens once we have the parsimony requirement? Don't we reflect on our prior principles and conclude that they turn out, in retrospect, to be problematic since we ought not believe them due to parsimony?
This is a pretty tough challenge, I think. One way to respond to it is to tweak the parsimony requirement so that it doesn't kill epistemology, and I actually think that this is pretty reasonable. It's overly simple to say that the parsimony requirement is that we simply never believe anything without having an epistemic reason. A fine way of putting it is that we don't believe extra things, and "extra" is glossed in the following way: non-elemental beliefs that we have no epistemic reason to believe.
In short, the argument was that the burden of proof could be shifted away from the moral realist by noting there is an unavoidable arbitrariness in epistemology. The problem with this argument is that it doesn't really respond to the parsimony requirement, as provide a route for avoiding it. That wasn't the clearest sentence I've written in my life, so let me try again.
The problem for the Moral Realist is that parsimony requires that we don't believe that which we have no good reason to believe. And the response I offer, essentially, says that there are some cases in which parsimony isn't required. There's actually no parsimony requirement for our most basic beliefs.
Here are a couple concerns with this argument:
1) Does this mean that ANYTHING can avoid the parsimony requirement? Why only things like moral realism, treating our moral intuitions as ways of getting at moral facts?
Well, not anything. It's just that some epistemic beliefs/principles are prior to the parsimony requirement. They just happen to avoid it.
2) That's not going to cut it as a response. What if we took the parsimony requirement to be our first, most basic epistemic principle?
Then there's no room for epistemology, and you can't get going. You need to take some things on without having epistemic reason to if you're going to get anything at all.
3) What happens once we have the parsimony requirement? Don't we reflect on our prior principles and conclude that they turn out, in retrospect, to be problematic since we ought not believe them due to parsimony?
This is a pretty tough challenge, I think. One way to respond to it is to tweak the parsimony requirement so that it doesn't kill epistemology, and I actually think that this is pretty reasonable. It's overly simple to say that the parsimony requirement is that we simply never believe anything without having an epistemic reason. A fine way of putting it is that we don't believe extra things, and "extra" is glossed in the following way: non-elemental beliefs that we have no epistemic reason to believe.
Thursday, April 29, 2010
Reading Gibbard, Chap 4
Chapter 4--Normative Psychology
"Competing Systems of Control"--He starts by thinking about "weakness of will" cases. In this section Gibbard distinguishes between animal control system and the normative control system. The normative control system is posited to be only a motivating force for humans, and to have a lot to do with language. A norm is a linguistically encoded precept. The normative control system has a lot to do with language, and that "a lot" has to do with coordination problems and planning problems. This is just supposed to be a good start, not the end of the story. But in this section we get conflicts between normative and animal control systems.
"Conflicts with Social Motivations"--In this section we get conflicts with social motivations and the normative control system. Above we didn't have conflicts between norms. This time we have conflicts between norms. But it's not symmetric. It's the difference between two psychological states, that of accepting a norm and that of being in the grip of a norm.
"Biological Adaptation"--Some scientific speculation. He admits that more solid investigation is needed, and he invites it. The biological function of a faculty for accepting and being governed by norms is coordination. The capacity to accept norms and being in their grip are both coordination systems, though the former is distinctly human, and depends on language.
"The Biology of Coordination"--"It is in the role of language in coordinating behavior and expectations, I shall be suggesting, that we can discern what is special about accepting norms."
"Internalizing Norms"--This term refers to what being in the grip of a norm and accepting a norm have in common. Animals are capable of internalizing norms. No decision involved, it's just built into their instincts. e.g. conversational distance. Sophisticated observers can formulate these norms, though usually those who respect the norms aren't able to even notice them. "What then might we mean here by a norm? By the norm itself I suggest, we should mean simply a prescription or imperative that gives the rule a sophisticated observer could formulate." To internalize a norm is to have a motivational tendency to act on that pattern.
"Accepting Norms"--"The state of accepting a norm is identified b its place in a syndrome of tendencies toward action and avowal. This has to do with the language-infused system of coordination peculiar to humans. We accept norms in the context of normative discusion, actual and imaginary. We take positions and thereby expose ourselves to deamnds for consistency.
"Acceptance, Action, Persuasion"
"Normative Discussion and Philosophy" [Skipped these sections.]
"Competing Systems of Control"--He starts by thinking about "weakness of will" cases. In this section Gibbard distinguishes between animal control system and the normative control system. The normative control system is posited to be only a motivating force for humans, and to have a lot to do with language. A norm is a linguistically encoded precept. The normative control system has a lot to do with language, and that "a lot" has to do with coordination problems and planning problems. This is just supposed to be a good start, not the end of the story. But in this section we get conflicts between normative and animal control systems.
"Conflicts with Social Motivations"--In this section we get conflicts with social motivations and the normative control system. Above we didn't have conflicts between norms. This time we have conflicts between norms. But it's not symmetric. It's the difference between two psychological states, that of accepting a norm and that of being in the grip of a norm.
"Biological Adaptation"--Some scientific speculation. He admits that more solid investigation is needed, and he invites it. The biological function of a faculty for accepting and being governed by norms is coordination. The capacity to accept norms and being in their grip are both coordination systems, though the former is distinctly human, and depends on language.
"The Biology of Coordination"--"It is in the role of language in coordinating behavior and expectations, I shall be suggesting, that we can discern what is special about accepting norms."
"Internalizing Norms"--This term refers to what being in the grip of a norm and accepting a norm have in common. Animals are capable of internalizing norms. No decision involved, it's just built into their instincts. e.g. conversational distance. Sophisticated observers can formulate these norms, though usually those who respect the norms aren't able to even notice them. "What then might we mean here by a norm? By the norm itself I suggest, we should mean simply a prescription or imperative that gives the rule a sophisticated observer could formulate." To internalize a norm is to have a motivational tendency to act on that pattern.
"Accepting Norms"--"The state of accepting a norm is identified b its place in a syndrome of tendencies toward action and avowal. This has to do with the language-infused system of coordination peculiar to humans. We accept norms in the context of normative discusion, actual and imaginary. We take positions and thereby expose ourselves to deamnds for consistency.
"Acceptance, Action, Persuasion"
"Normative Discussion and Philosophy" [Skipped these sections.]
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